

# CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

AUGUST, 1969

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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# CURRENT History

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*In the last of a 3-issue set on United States military commitments, 8 articles evaluate the history and scope of United States commitments in Asia. The introductory article shows that "United States involvement in China was neither sudden nor accidental. . . . The historical record helps to explain United States involvement in Asia. . . ."*

## Before Pearl Harbor

BY WALTER LAFEVER

*Professor of History, Cornell University*

FOR NEARLY a century before Pearl Harbor, Americans sought riches and empire in the Far East. The events of December 7, 1941, climaxed that quest, but did not signal the denouement. The momentum of history was too strong, and the United States resumed the quest after 1945 with increased power, better strategy and greater disasters. The present American dilemmas in Asia, and particularly the deadlocks in the relations between the United States and China, must be explained in the context of 125 years of Sino-American relations. The burdens which that history imposes will not be easily lifted. Not even a people so favored as the Americans can begin a new day in foreign policy by pretending that the obligations, prejudices and ambitions of the day before no longer matter.

In that sense, United States involvement with the Far East can be traced back well before the 1840's when the first Sino-American treaty (the Treaty of Wanghai, July 3, 1844) was formally signed. The term "Far East," indeed, is misleading, for Americans have always regarded China as an extension of their own drive west for empire. Frederick Jackson Turner wrote in the 1890's that the interest of his countrymen in the affairs of

the western Pacific was not accidental, but was the natural outcome of their settlement of the western plains.

Until the 1840's, perhaps, the use of the European view that Asia lay to the east was of some relevance to United States thinking; thereafter several events reshaped that perception. California and Oregon were settled and brought within the Union, giving the United States direct access to the Pacific. A spirit of Manifest Destiny gripped the country, allowing empire-builders to justify the war with Mexico and the taking of the West Coast as only a part of an irresistible march across the continent to the Pacific and beyond. This spirit was evident in the accelerating industrial revolution that marked the decade and created a business complex that would view China as the last and greatest of all markets. The spirit was also embodied in the American missionaries who were the products of the nation's drive for reform and sanctity in many areas of society (particularly, of course, in regard to slavery), and who, in the century which followed, led the penetration of China for American secular as well as spiritual interests.

Perhaps these changes were best symbolized by Asa Whitney, a hard-driving entrepreneur

dedicated to the building of the transcontinental railroad in the 1840's. Whitney exemplified what historian Charles Vevier has labelled American Continentalism. This philosophy held that the great Mississippi Valley must be developed for two reasons. It would provide an area of production whose immense surpluses could be marketed abroad and thus suck wealth from around the world into the United States. It would also be a bridge between east and west, the vital link of a great highway which could carry the products of Europe, the eastern United States and the valley itself to Pacific ports and hence to the fabled markets of Asia. As Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton bragged, the legendary "road to Cathay" would be opened through the heartland of the United States. (It is not a coincidence that the Midwest has been the most vocal section in demanding the restoration of pre-1949 China.) The first formal diplomatic step occurred in 1844, when Commissioner Caleb Cushing negotiated the Treaty of Wanghai, with China guaranteeing United States ships entry into ports which the Chinese had opened to the British the year before.

### THE COURSE OF EMPIRE

These and subsequent events must also be placed in another historical context. Since at least the seventeenth century, men have argued that the course of empire has moved historically from east to west. Americans seized upon this belief, using it to justify their hope that inevitably the New World would rise as the Old World declined, and using it also to justify their involvement in Asian affairs. For if power did move westward (and a superficial reading of history seemed to indicate that the imperial centers had moved from Asia Minor to Greece to Rome to Paris to London and then to the United States), then it followed that the western Pacific would be the next cockpit of international power. This moved such Americans as historian Brooks Adams (at the turn of the twentieth century) and founder of Time-Life Inc. Henry Luce (in 1941) to conclude that the American future depended largely

on the control or at least the westernization of the Orient and especially of China.

Perhaps no American statesman held this view more strongly than William Seward. He was one of the leading Whig and Republican Senators in the 1850's, ending his public career as Secretary of State for Abraham Lincoln and for Andrew Johnson between 1861 and 1869. Seward wrote that he saw power moving east to west through precisely that nation whose foreign policies he would direct. A visit to the Seward home in Auburn, New York, is revealing for this reason. A visitor scanning the library is struck by the New Yorker's interest in British imperial events which, in the mid-nineteenth century, centered on India and China. The house also contains shelves of fine dishes and other mementos from Asia, many of which Seward obtained during his trips overseas. This was the atmosphere in which he lived.

His belief in the United States destiny in Asia became a reality when, in 1867, he negotiated the purchase of Alaska from Russia for \$7.2 million. At the time this territory was called the "drawbridge to Asia," and certainly Seward viewed the triumph partially in that perspective. The following year he negotiated (with Anson Burlingame, former United States Minister to China and at that time the envoy of the Emperor of China) a treaty which enlarged United States commercial rights in China and allowed for the immigration of Chinese into the United States. Seward could look back at his accomplishments with considerable satisfaction. He had found Chinese markets for the burgeoning American industry, brought in cheap labor, removed the threat of an ambitious Russia operating on the North American continent, opened up new avenues to Asia, all this time, of course, helping Lincoln to preserve the Union, which in the future could profit from such diplomacy.

He made one further fundamental contribution to American policy. Until the 1860's, there was a question as to which diplomatic tactics would best accomplish the goals of American empire in the Far East. The choices had to be made from two sets of al-



ternatives: the United States could cooperate with European powers in developing China or it could try to go it alone; and Americans could use force to obtain their objectives or could attempt to use non-military tactics which, hopefully, would set them apart from and above the European gunboat diplomats in the minds of Chinese officials. Seward chose to cooperate with the Europeans and to join them in their use of force, particularly in regard to affairs during the 1860's in Japan and Korea.

United States policies with China proceeded to move along the course which Seward had charted.<sup>1</sup> During the 32 years that followed the Alaska Purchase, the United States established an island chain which could be utilized by commerce or a fighting navy. Midway was obtained in 1867; then the magnificent harbor of Pago Pago in Samoa was acquired in 1878; Pearl Harbor was leased in 1887; and the entire Hawaiian chain was annexed in June, 1898. Hawaii became part of the United States during the three-month war with Spain in 1898. That conflict's primary result was the annexation of the Philippines in February, 1899. Absorbing the Philippines not only completed the island-chain of bases, but occurred within the context of an international power struggle over China. That struggle explains why the United States annexed the Philippines and opened the twentieth century by sending Marines to the mainland of China itself.

### POWER STRUGGLE IN CHINA

With the defeat of China by Japan in a short struggle in 1894-1895, Japan emerged as a leading world power and the Chinese empire could finally be seen clearly as a crumbling shell. Germany, Russia, France and Great Britain entered a quick, dramatic race for supremacy in the vital market and raw material regions in and around China, threatening to lop off parts of China and close those sections to other nations, so that the victors could enjoy undisturbed exploita-

tion of Chinese raw materials and markets.

The administration of William McKinley realized that these European policies threatened the traditional United States policy of keeping China whole and open to all powers. Americans had just endured the terrible economic depression and social instability of the 1890's, and key businessmen and public officials believed that the Chinese market was essential for long-term American prosperity. With its new industrial prowess, moreover, the United States could easily compete for markets in China with other powers as long as there was a "fair field and no favor," as Secretary of State John Hay phrased it. The United States wanted no part of a colonial scramble on the Asian mainland.

On September 6, 1899, Secretary Hay formally declared the Open Door policy when he asked Great Britain, Germany and Russia (and, shortly afterwards, France, Japan and Italy) to agree that in any European sphere of interest which already existed in China, equality would be guaranteed to all in the application of harbor and railroad levies and, further, that the Chinese government should be recognized as the legitimate collector of tariffs within the government's realm.

Ten months later, Hay and McKinley confronted an anti-Western uprising in China led by a fanatical sect called Boxers. Officials in Washington correctly feared that European powers would use the rebellion as an excuse to send in troops to partition desirable parts of China. On July 3, 1900, Hay once again asked the other powers to agree to a formula which would pledge them to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity" and "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." On August 14, foreign troops—including United States Marines—landed to protect foreign legations, and attempted to restore order.

Seward's policies, modified by Hay and McKinley, faced grave tests from two sides. For the first time, the threat of Chinese revolution became real. The United States hurried to join the other powers in eradicating the Boxers and restabilizing parts of China,

<sup>1</sup> Historian Tyler Dennett wrote in the 1920's that no official added anything essential to United States policy towards China after Seward retired.

for only in a settled non-revolutionary China could the Open Door policy work. But the major powers were not united. Great Britain and Japan allied in 1902 to confront the growing Russian challenge to British control in India and Japanese interests in Manchuria and Korea. The United States favored the British and Japanese, in part because of a common hatred for and fear of the Czar's government, and also because Washington officials mistakenly assumed that Japan shared a long-run commitment to the Open Door and could be depended upon to beat off any Russian threats to the "fair field and no favor" principle. This assumed a relative balance of power between Japan and Russia. That premise was destroyed in 1905 when the Japanese defeated the Russians in a short conflict and set off the revolutionary events which would topple the Czar's regime 12 years later.

By 1907, the Japanese were the dominant power in Asia. The British empire acquiesced as Japan made a protectorate of Korea and began closing the door to Manchuria. No important American counseled the abandonment of China. The United States could either cooperate with the Japanese in Asia or attempt to contain Japan; the latter choice might ultimately mean using force to stop Tokyo from closing the door to China. Economic, missionary and international power considerations required a United States commitment. The already voluminous historical record that revealed the development of Sino-American ties could not be expunged.

The long love affair which many Americans believed they were having with China now became a three-way relationship and, as in most such love triangle situations, it could be guaranteed that at any given moment two of the participants could be counted on to hate the third. The only question was the circumstances that would dictate the pairing off.

## WORLD WAR I

With the advent of World War I, the United States attempted to stand with China against Japan. Taking advantage of the European powers' determination to bleed one

another thousands of miles from China, Japan conquered several German holdings on the Chinese periphery; then, in the fall and winter of 1914-1915, she attempted to put China under *de facto* Japanese control by handing Peking the Twenty-One Demands. These demands would have given Japan a large measure of control over Chinese police, financial and military policies and would also have given her large economic concessions.

President Woodrow Wilson's administration, after some initial and nearly fatal fumbblings, vigorously protested the Japanese policy; but it was British pressure that finally forced Japan to retreat. Two years later, when the United States entered World War I, British power had greatly diminished. With American attention riveted on France, Japan was without a real power check in the Far East. In the autumn of 1917, however, the United States and Japan agreed (in the Lansing-Ishii Notes) that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." In return, the Japanese promised, in a secret protocol to the agreements, that they would not take advantage of the European conflict to make new demands upon China.

The Lansing-Ishii Notes heralded a 15-year period of United States-Japanese cooperation on the problem of handling China. Differences did appear, particularly when the Japanese insisted at the Paris Peace Conference that they must retain the former German possession of Shantung, which the Chinese claimed as part of their own ancient empire. The Japanese position particularly compromised President Wilson's widely publicized policy of self-determination, and the President's failure to force Japan to return Shantung in 1919 was one reason why the United States Senate then rejected the Wilsonian settlement. The Shantung question, however, paled in significance in the light of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the May, 1919, revolutionary movement in China itself.

Those two upheavals led the officials in Tokyo and Washington to formulate common policies to deal with China. The keynote

was sounded at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922. This conference laid down the guidelines which United States policy-makers, Republicans and Democrats alike, would follow throughout the entire interwar period. It also raised important questions about the so-called “isolationist” policy of the Republicans. The conference not only produced a political agreement which the United States happily signed, but created an international power alignment which the United States pledged to uphold.

The Americans scored first with the Four-Power Pact, in which the United States, Japan, France and Great Britain agreed to respect each other's rights in the Pacific and to refer disputes to a joint conference. This agreement ended the 19-year-old Anglo-Japanese alliance, thereby freeing Washington officials from the fear that in any future disputes they would have to face a formally allied British-Japanese coalition. The next victory was the Five-Power Treaty, signed February 6, 1922, by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, which established a capital ship ratio of 5–5–3–1.75–1.75 among the powers. The first three nations also agreed not to construct new naval bases or fortifications west of Hawaii, north of Singapore, or south of Japan.

United States naval officers bitterly fought this agreement, for they understood that Japan would emerge as the paramount naval power in the western Pacific. Their complaints made little headway, and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes apparently systematically excluded military officers from any important role at the conference. Hughes was willing to accept what the Five-Power agreement implied: a tripartite division of the world, with Japan dominant in the western Pacific, the United States paramount in the Western Hemisphere, and the three victorious European powers controlling Europe. Together, the five powers would stabilize world affairs, that is, contain revolutions and make the world safe for their own methods of international development.

For China, the meaning of this pact became clear in the formulation of the Nine-Power

Treaty at Washington. Signed by the five major powers plus Belgium, Portugal, China and the Netherlands, this document became the only formal, specific affirmation of the Open Door policy ever agreed upon by these major powers. The signatories agreed to respect the

sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, [and] to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

When the Chinese delegation attempted to regain for China some control over her own tariffs and also over foreigners within China, the other powers, led by the United States, refused.

At Washington, the United States agreed to give Japan naval control of the western Pacific in return for Japan's promise to maintain the Open Door in China. Two assumptions of this agreement are crucial in understanding the 20 years between the conference and Pearl Harbor. First, both powers feared the revolution which was picking up speed in China, but they believed that they could return to the pre-Boxer China by treating the Chinese in the traditional manner. China was viewed as passive; she was the bone in the middle, as Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau aptly characterized China a decade later. Second, the United States assumed that with the Nine-Power agreement signed and sealed, Japan could be depended upon to cooperate with and protect the historic United States interests in China. Or as a young, aspiring New York politician, Franklin D. Roosevelt, phrased the policy in the early 1920's, the United States and Japan would march shoulder to shoulder in developing Asia.

## REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Both assumptions were wrecked within 10 years. By 1924, the Russian Bolshevik government was committed to aiding the Chinese revolutionaries. The Chinese needed little help. The success of their revolution was

marked by intense anti-foreign outbreaks, particularly against missionaries, between 1925 and 1927. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the dominant figure within the Nationalist organization, broke with Russia, and drove the Chinese Communists out of the movement. The United States reaction to Chiang's triumph was confused and inconsistent, shaped no doubt by the chaos within China herself.

By 1930, President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry Stimson mistrusted the Chinese and preferred to cooperate with Japan to keep China open and as stable as possible. At the London Naval Conference of 1930, the United States agreed to grant the Japanese request for complete parity in submarines and an improved position in destroyers and cruisers. The basic assumption, that Japan could be depended upon by the United States, still prevailed. Indeed, in the context of the revolutions in Russia and China, Americans wanted to believe this more than ever before.

Consequently when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September, 1931, the United States reaction was less than inspired. The invasion had been triggered by an explosion along the track of the Chinese Eastern Railway near Mukden where the Japanese were in control. Toyko claimed that the rails had been blown up by Chinese soldiers. With this explanation, the Japanese interpreted the incident as another anti-foreign outbreak and thereby played neatly to the fears of Stimson and Hoover—fears that unless they were brought under control the Chinese Nationalists would succeed in driving out all foreign interests from China. Indeed, in 1929, when a similar incident developed between the Russians and the Chinese, Stimson had supported the Russians (although the United States did not recognize that the Moscow government existed officially) because of his fear that to do otherwise would encourage the Chinese to undertake further actions against foreign interests.

Trapped between this traditional fear and the growing realization that Japan was carrying out a systematic policy aimed at con-

quering the whole of Manchuria, Hoover and Stimson hesitated. As the President commented in one conversation with members of his Cabinet, he sympathized with the Japanese because they were confronted with a Bolshevik Russia on one flank and the possibility of a Bolshevik China on the other flank.

As the Japanese attack spread in January and February, 1932, Stimson pressed for counteraction. The President blocked any use of military or economic coercion. The use of such force might temporarily slow up the Japanese, but it would surely be double-edged, for it would declare bankrupt the assumption of United States policy which had guided American diplomats in Asian affairs since 1921 and, moreover, it could lead to war with Japan. Stimson consequently settled for an announcement on January 7, 1932, that the United States would not recognize any

situation or any treaty or agreement entered into between [Japan and China] which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy.

A month later this "non-recognition doctrine" was coupled with another policy, which was announced in a letter from Stimson to Senate leader William Borah. Stimson warned that the Washington Conference treaties were interrelated; that is, if Japan violated the Open Door provisions of the Nine-Power treaty, the United States would be free of the restrictions written into the naval arrangements of the Five-Power Pact.

(Continued on page 114)

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*"Military exigencies had been great catalysts for change along the far side of the Pacific basin. . . . In the vast area of former European colonial holdings, our military policies ultimately took on a subtler and more consciously political afterglow."*

## World War II in Asia

BY ROSS N. BERKES

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IN THE LONG, confusing year that stretched between the summers of 1940 and 1941, the United States groped uncertainly for a role in the high drama of world events—something clear and simple, heroic and decisive, something to end the dissonance and tentativeness of its policies and objectives. It might never have resolved the dilemma without the unfriendly hand of Japan at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

At one blow, by temporarily crippling the United States fleet, Japan inadvertently saved us from turning ultimately to an Alice-in-Wonderland war plan called Rainbow 5—something which, in the colorful imagery of a scornful Samuel E. Morison, could well have sent the ill-prepared fleet "lumbering across the Pacific, very likely to be sunk in deep water by Japanese bombers based on the Marshall Islands."<sup>1</sup>

Diplomatically and militarily, the United States was hardly ready to play a leading role in Asia in the middle of 1941, but it seized the role anyhow, daring Japan by an embargo to choose between conquest in Southeast Asia and abandonment of her aggressive ways. Seeing it all now, through later memoirs and historians' accounts, almost everyone expected Japan to elect the former.

Of course, there remained such questions as to how and where Japan would strike, and whether such action would bring us into the war willy-nilly. Ironically, we even anticipated the *how* and *where* by nearly a year, for as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox wrote on January 24, 1941: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor."<sup>2</sup> To be sure, other alternatives were as "easily possible," and these were suggested no less frequently, but it is unsettling to see such a statement staring back at us now, however disguised it was as somewhat idle prophecy.

One of the bigger United States ploys during this year of confusion in the Pacific was to move the fleet from San Diego to Hawaii, ostensibly for annual maneuvers, and then to keep it there at the insistence of President Franklin Roosevelt for its presumed "deterrent effect" on Japan. In a way the United States was stymied, for after Japan and the Axis powers signed the Tripartite Pact in September, 1940, the State Department advisers felt that the fleet could not return to the mainland without Japan interpreting the move as an American retreat. The commanding admiral, James O. Richardson, remained unimpressed by such sophistry, but in clashing with Roosevelt he lost, and was soon replaced by Husband E. Kimmel.

Throughout this delicate period, United

<sup>1</sup> Samuel Eliot Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), p. 68.

<sup>2</sup> Memo to the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, quoted in Jules Davids, *America and the World of Our Time* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 220.

States military leaders were patently nervous and unhappy, not least because Roosevelt was playing his own game with the most important military asset the United States had at the time: the Pacific Fleet. The United States could not afford to have it embroiled halfway around the world if the Axis powers took over the French Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets, and the United States was likely to find the fleet so embroiled if Japan decided to move against the Philippines. Adding to the confusion, the United States was about to reverse one of the premises underlying its entire Far Eastern strategy: the simple if somewhat embarrassing premise that in case of war with Japan, the Philippines could not be defended. What was changing the premise were the B-17's, and the prospect that we could position enough of these Flying Fortresses in the Philippines by the spring of 1942 to make the islands defensible.

Pearl Harbor changed all that and more. The first of the wartime associates to react was Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who called a conference in Chungking on December 17, 1941, to include the British—and even the Russians if they chose to attend—in the hope of getting the major anti-Axis powers to concentrate on the war in Asia. The United States government, concerned with the struggle General Douglas MacArthur was having in the Philippines, seemed favorably disposed toward emphasizing the necessity for a vigorous response in the Far East. This alarmed the British, particularly Prime Minister Winston Churchill, whose interest in deploying British (or even American) forces against the Japanese was never very great, at least not until the war in Europe had been won.

Following the Chungking meeting came the first of the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences, known by the code name Arcadia, and held in Washington beginning December 22, 1941. Arcadia was a remarkable conference, not only for its results (which included the "Europe-first" strategy), but also for the preemptive way it implied that strategic decisions for the Pacific war would be an Anglo-

American monopoly. Australia, for one, smarted severely because of the continuance of parental prerogatives exercised by the British. Less than 100 days later, quietly supported by the United States, Australian statesmanship managed to dislodge Great Britain from her preferential role in Pacific war councils and commands. It did so largely through the creation of a command structure in the Pacific to succeed the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command established at Arcadia and placed under British Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Wavell.

General Wavell assumed command on January 15, 1942. Neither his authority nor his influence extended to MacArthur's beleaguered command in the Philippines, or to the China theater under the ostensibly supreme command of Chiang Kai-shek. The only two capital ships the British had in the entire Asian theater were already lost, sunk east of Singapore in the first days of the war, and Wavell's unhappy task became one of desperate stands and no less desperate evacuations throughout the south and southwest Pacific. Concerned almost to the point of fixation with the defense of Singapore, the British were comforted that Wavell would at least not drain away the remaining strength of his command trying to save either Burma or the Philippines. Yet he did attempt to divert one or both of the blooded Australian divisions being called back from the Mediterranean. He ordered them to Burma, whereupon the Australian government challenged and ultimately countermanded the order, arguing that the troops were needed at home, not in Burma where they might well be destroyed in a hopeless defensive battle.

United States concern with the southwest Pacific in this period had two aspects: to preserve a lifeline from the United States to Australia, and to keep the Burma Road open as a way (indeed, the only way) to supply China so that she could remain in the fight against Japan. Wavell appealed for United States troops to help in the defense of Australia, but one of the Army's chief planning officers for the Pacific, a Colonel Dwight

Eisenhower, tried to insist—at least for a while—that air support should be the extent of the United States military commitment in the southwest Pacific.

Singapore fell one month from the day Wavell took over the ABDA Command. The shock and shame of it clung to the British conscience for the next three and a half years of war in the Pacific. Similarly, the fact that the United States was driven from the Philippines influenced American strategy. Soon the skein of General MacArthur's Pacific strategy began to reveal the strands of his concern that the road to Tokyo ran through, not around, the Philippines.

At this point the crest of the Japanese wave had not yet passed; Burma, Ceylon, what remained of the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the antipodes themselves, and the eastern island chain protecting them, were the critical areas. John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, made a historic statement shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in effect informing the world that Australia would turn to the United States for protection and support. In a most memorable passage, he declared: "Australia looks to America free from the pangs about our traditional links of friendship with Britain. . . . We shall exert our energy toward shaping a plan with the United States as its keystone. . . ." In the same speech, Curtin added a sequel to Australia's uneasiness over the decision-making role of the Anglo-American Arcadia conference by maintaining that in the Pacific war, "the United States and Australia should have the fullest say in the direction of the fighting plan."<sup>3</sup>

On the very next day, Roosevelt announced that the United States would assist Australia and make her an operational base for United States forces. From then on, Australia played a key role in United States military planning. Even so, the Australian goal was not yet won, for Arcadia created the Anglo-

American Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was to consider matters of joint concern regarding the Pacific war as well as all other matters of combined wartime planning. This could only subordinate Australia; thus, in the collapse of General Wavell's efforts to make effective use of the ABDA Command against the onrushing Japanese, Australia and New Zealand met to create their own new strategic area and to invite a United States officer to take supreme operational command. A month later, the forceful Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, presented the Australian-New Zealand plan to Washington. As one authority records it, the Australian Prime Minister paved the way for Evatt by a radio broadcast in which he complained that "even now, after ninety-five days of Japan's staggering advance south, we have not obtained first-hand contact with America."<sup>4</sup>

Out of this defiant self-assertiveness, Australia got what she wanted. Spirited out of the Philippines on orders from Washington, General MacArthur turned up in Australia to assume command of the Allied forces in the southwest Pacific, with an Australian named as commander of the Allied Land Forces, and another American selected to head the Allied Air Forces. Moreover, a new Pacific war council was established with headquarters in Washington, composed of representatives from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China and the Netherlands.

All of this took place in March, 1942, as Japan reached and passed the crest of her "staggering advance south," before the great naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in the early summer and the New Guinea campaign a bit later. In the latter, the fighting was largely Australian and American; in the former it was exclusively American. In essence, the Pacific theater had become an American theater. The United States made the decisions, and in large measure fought the battles. What was left in eastern Asia in terms of British commitment and participation was soon to become an awkward perennial: Burma, and the on-again-off-again effort to reopen the Burma

<sup>3</sup> The three quotations from or about the Curtin speech of December 27, 1941, are taken from Werner Levi, *American-Australian Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1947), p. 150.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

Road. Churchill played the Burma card with consummate skill, dangling the threat of discarding it in the process of winning American support for just one more North African, Middle East, Mediterranean enterprise. Otherwise—even including the vast and complicated China theater—Britain was out of the Asian war.

There remained, however, the wartime conferences between Churchill and Roosevelt, and the conferences at Teheran and Yalta where they met with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and even the meeting at Cairo with Chiang Kai-shek. World War II, after all, was a global war with many fronts, and what happened on one front affected the others. A year passed between the Churchill-Roosevelt Arcadia meeting in Washington and their meeting in Casablanca in January, 1943. With the brilliant naval victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway, and the grim but ultimately successful recapture of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, the United States was building momentum for a huge offensive in the Pacific. The great issue at Casablanca was how the Americans could preserve and increase this momentum and at the same time honor their obligations and meet British pleas for a greater development of United States military power in the European and Mediterranean theaters. The American case, presented firmly and simply by General George Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, was that unless the United States could retain its initiative against Japan, "a situation might arise which would necessitate [its] withdrawing from commitments in the European theater."<sup>5</sup> While not inexplicable, this was a remarkable posture, considering the fact that the United States was using the same conference to press Great Britain into a massive, combined, cross-channel invasion of Europe in 1943.

Britain wanted to concentrate on a Medi-

terranean campaign in 1943, using the year to soften Germany up through waves of bomber sorties. Essentially the United States yielded, allowing itself more time to put more into the Pacific war. As General Marshall put it, he was "opposed to immobilizing a large force in the United Kingdom for eighteen months; the United States could better apply [its] strength to the Pacific."<sup>6</sup> In addition, Churchill's argument about breaking Germany down through an extended period of air assaults had its counterpart in Roosevelt's inclination to reach into the Japanese homeland through a dramatic build-up of United States air bases in China, and possibly in Soviet Siberia.

### U.S. AIMS IN CHINA

Comment on the China theater and the strategic stake of the United States therein should be short. To Roosevelt, and to other American leaders at the time, China had a special value. Churchill candidly chided Roosevelt over his inflated estimate of China's role. Stalin was puzzled by it. Almost the only constant postwar image nursed by Roosevelt throughout this period—other than that of a docile and friendly Soviet Union built out of reassuring smiles whenever the Russians were looking—was that of a strong, unified China somehow taking Japan's place in the exalted ranks of Asian leadership. The aim of preserving China for the future meshed harmoniously with the more immediate aim of preserving China as a fighting ally. Militarily the United States had two aims in China: Roosevelt, General Claire S. Chennault, and Chiang Kai-shek felt that air bases there were of strategic importance, and they hoped China could produce a vastly stepped up military capability for pinning down and helping destroy the large Japanese forces in China while Americans fought their way through the main Japanese islands to Japan's final surrender.

To help Chiang, the United States gave him an American Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell. By the time Stilwell arrived in Chungking in March, 1942, he was faced with the collapse of Burma and the

<sup>5</sup> This quotation and other arguments presented at Casablanca are found masterfully presented in Samuel E. Morison's *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II*, Vol. VI: *Breaking the Bismarck's Barrier*, 22 July 1942–1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), pp. 3–5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.



closing of the Burma Road. From then on, for two and a half incredible years, Stilwell fought to reopen the Burma Road, or build a new one, and fought to build at least some of the tattered and dispirited Chinese divisions into effective fighting units. Except for his own unbridled tactlessness, Stilwell's most powerful enemy was Chiang himself. How the Chief of Staff to an oriental Supreme Commander of several million troops could refer to his superior almost exclusively and always derisively as "Peanut," and yet survive to work another day for all that time defies logic. But he did, chiefly because of his unquestioned competence, the special wardship some of our War Department people extended to him (people such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson), and the unquenchable conviction in many quarters that Stilwell was good for Chiang. To add to his difficulties, Stilwell had to contend with the professional rivalry of Major General Chennault of Flying Tiger fame, now commander of the China-based Fourteenth Air Force. Chennault was colorful and eloquent; his faith in air power was persuasive. By gaining Chiang's support, Chennault in effect killed whatever remaining hope Stilwell had for the success of his own mission.

Roosevelt's growing disillusionment with Chiang was accompanied by a rising hope that the Soviet Union would join in the war against Japan, and that it would offer to accommodate American bombers operating from Siberian bases. Until the last several months of the war the United States was convinced of the essential importance of Russia's active participation—not that the Asian war could not be won without Soviet help, but that the cost in time and sacrifice would be tremendous. The appeal of Soviet entry heightened when the very success of Chennault's China-based B-29's unexpectedly led Japan to arouse her long-idle forces in China in a move to capture the bases. This Japan did, one after the other, as it became clear that Japanese fighters could not get at the B-29's, whose ingenious new fire-

control system shot the fighters right out of the sky. The ultimate irony was the now-revealed if unspoken truth that Stilwell had been right all along: the success of Chennault's incredibly expensive air base build-up in China depended on China's capacity to deliver the defensive forces able and willing to fight off seasoned Japanese troops. In the end, not one Chinese air base was left in Allied hands, and Chennault was out of business.

### SOVIET ENTRY

At the end of the Pacific war, in the China theater, Soviet entry into the war did nothing for the Chinese Communists, but helped Chiang Kai-shek a great deal, albeit at the price of providing important military and economic facilities in Manchuria for the Russians. Whenever the Russians accepted the surrender of Japanese troops in China, they did not hold the territory or the troops for the Chinese Communists. While there was a fairly dramatic race between the Kuomintang and the Communists for territorial prizes in north China, (the Soviet Union seemed on the whole loyal to its commitment to the Chinese nationalists and insensitive to the fate of the Communists. If anyone realized the incipient strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communists at the end of the war, it was not the Soviet Union.)

Elsewhere, Japan's sudden surrender left an equally awkward vacuum, which the United States took upon itself to fill by announcing the rules for the surrender of Japanese troops throughout Asia. This was President Harry Truman's General Order No. 1, of August 14, 1945. In the words of one commentator, General Order No. 1 "was a grand and sweeping American attempt to define the political outcome of the war in the Far East insofar as the military position of the forces of the various Allies would determine it."<sup>7</sup> The allies were not given an opportunity to approve the order; the United States sent it to them only as a matter of information, operating somewhat arbitrarily from the premise that General Mac-

<sup>7</sup> Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 601.

Arthur, as Supreme Allied Commander, retained absolute control over the Japanese surrender everywhere.<sup>8</sup>

In its basic arrangements, General Order No. 1 directed that Nationalist Chinese forces were to receive the surrender in China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indochina north of the 16th parallel. The Soviet forces were to receive the surrender in Manchuria, Karafuto and Korea north of the 38th parallel. The United States would receive the surrender in the main islands, in those it had bypassed, and in Korea south of the 38th parallel. Finally, Great Britain would receive the surrender in Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and French Indochina south of the 16th parallel.

Considering all that has since happened since those lines were drawn for Korea and Indochina (the two lines were originally drawn at the Potsdam conference, but with no greater care), it seems unreal that they emerged so casually. Even a brief review of the immediate consequences explains some of the developments that emerged from the collapse of the sprawling Japanese empire.

Although the United States was happy to endorse the Korean movement for independence from Japan soon after it entered the war, it was generally assumed that there would be a period of tutelage under some form of international trusteeship. The 38th parallel was to provide a brake on the Russian occupation forces. When the United States sent a force of its own into Korea, it found that the Soviets had in fact gone considerably south of the 38th parallel in several places and had already accepted the surrender of the Japanese. Much to the relief of the United States, however, the Soviets moved out as soon as American troops arrived. That they began immediately to close off Korea above the 38th parallel was unsettling, but it took a while before the ultimate implications of the line began to appear.

The Dutch East Indies presented a different problem. The Japanese had de-

spoiled the country from the beginning of their occupation in 1942. They encouraged native nationalism, and when it became apparent that they would soon be driven out, they distributed arms, promised independence, and turned over the administration of the country to the collaborationist-patriots led by Sukarno and Hatta. When British forces arrived early in October, 1945, a self-proclaimed Indonesian Republic was already administering Java and Sumatra. The British troops were placed in an awkward position, for while they were unwilling to help legitimize the new regime, they were no less unhappy with the refusal of the returning Dutch officials to have anything to do with it. Ultimately, pressure from the British forces led the Dutch to begin negotiating with the Indonesians—a decision that culminated in the abortive Linggadjati Agreement nearly a year later.

Indochina and Thailand went a slightly different route. By the end of the war, both were being ruled by native groups who had either actually fought as guerrillas against the Japanese during the occupation, or had been openly backed by guerrilla groups. The Japanese stood aside, awaiting the arrival of the Allied forces. In the case of Thailand, no returning colonial power intruded, but in Indochina the French were eager to return. When they did, they were met by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—Ho Chi Minh and all. North of the 16th parallel, the Chinese occupation forces were most sympathetic and cooperative, but in the south it was quite different: the British commander had taken it upon himself to pave the way for the restoration of French control.<sup>9</sup>

The pattern in Burma had distinctive characteristics. The Japanese had instigated Burmese independence some time before the

(Continued on page 114)

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 600.

<sup>9</sup> Lawrence H. Bastistini, *The United States and Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1955), p.297.

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*Tracing the growing United States military commitment in Asia, this author points out that "Unlike the nations of Europe, the Asian nations lacked the skilled manpower and industrial bases to develop self-sustaining military strength. Whereas the military structures of such countries would never be strong enough to resist aggression, they would always exceed in cost what the Asian economies could support. Thus they threatened the United States with an endless financial drain without contributing much useful defense."*

## Global Containment: The Truman Years

BY NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

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**A**T MID-CENTURY, that pattern of challenge and response in international affairs known as the cold war was three years old. The fear of Soviet expansionism, incited in large measure by a powerful, if ill-defined, combination of Communist ideology, Soviet totalitarianism and Russian power, had produced a full-scale American response aimed at restricting Soviet political dominance to the regions of East-Central Europe where it then existed.

United States involvements in East Asia during the immediate postwar years, extensive as they were, had not brought the United States into any direct conflict with Soviet purpose. The Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, had announced a sweeping United States commitment to intervene everywhere in the world where governments might be threatened by communism regardless of the security interests involved or the prospects of success for any American effort. In practice, however, the Truman Doctrine had been limited to Greece and Turkey, and Secretary of State George C. Marshall had pointedly refused in 1948 to extend it to China. The emerging cold war, whatever its demands on American emotions and resources, remained a European phenomenon.

Perhaps the comparative complacency with which Americans viewed the Far East was

natural enough. For two long generations Japan had been the major, if not the exclusive, threat to a balanced and stable Orient. But the Japan of the late 1940's was an occupied nation, its military power broken. The continuing collapse of European colonialism in South and Southeast Asia threatened that region's historic stability.

But, nevertheless, to Americans generally even the Communist-led revolution in Indochina represented the ideal of self-determination far better than did French colonial policy. No aggressor had appeared anywhere on the scene to challenge the independence of the new Asian states, whatever their internal weakness.

China was the critical problem of the Far East. But even as Chiang Kai-shek slowly went down before Mao Tse-tung and his Chinese Communists in 1948 and 1949, the United States government did not recognize in this transfer of power in China any threat of aggression or danger to the United States. Indeed, until 1949 the United States did not reject the possibility of establishing normal and satisfactory relations with the new regime. To the extent that numerous Americans and potential critics of United States policy anticipated the Communist victory in China with deep regret, they regarded the new leadership as dangerous to Chinese traditions

and to China's historic relations with the United States. They feared above all that Mao might slam shut the Open Door and thus deprive American scholars, missionaries, travelers, officials and merchants of their former access to a country which was for them a region of immense charm. But even for the friends of China and of Chiang the closing of the Open Door and the subsequent mistreatment of American officials in China were not necessarily indications of Mao's aggressive intent toward China's neighbors. Communist influence and behavior in China might be tragic but did not automatically comprise a threat to United States security interests.

Still, there existed in 1949 a marked ambivalence in American attitudes toward the impending retreat of Chiang Kai-shek to the island of Formosa. Some Americans recalled Lenin's blueprint for Russian expansion: "First we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia. Then we will surround America, the last citadel of capitalism." The Western world could not ignore the fact that soon 900,000,000 million people would be living under Communist-led governments. Indeed, with the collapse of Nationalist China late in 1949, the United States entered a period of deep intellectual crisis. What mattered during these critical months of decision was the role which American officials, editors and political leaders—the creators of public opinion—chose to assign to the U.S.S.R. in the triumph of Communist power in China. The State Department's White Paper on China, published in August, 1949, publicly viewed the impending Communist victory in China as a legitimate expression of popular approval and thus no real challenge to Asian stability. But what had once appeared indigenous was beginning to loom as possibly the initial triumph of Soviet aggression as it moved into the Asian sphere.

After mid-1949, United States officials were no longer ruling out the possibility that China was being induced "to accept a disguised form of foreign rule"—as George F. Kennan expressed it in a radio program. Even in the China White Paper the new Secretary of

State, Dean Acheson, had called attention to the danger of Soviet imperialism in the Far East and reaffirmed United States opposition

to the subjugation of China by any foreign power, to any regime acting in the interest of a foreign power, and to the dismemberment of China by any foreign power, whether by open or clandestine means.

During July, 1949, Acheson had designated Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup to conduct an objective appraisal of Far Eastern problems and make recommendations for the formulation of an American strategy for Asia. Whereas it was clear that the administration would do nothing to save Chiang Kai-shek, Acheson, in a top-secret memorandum, instructed Jessup as follows:

You will please take as your assumption that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the southeast Asia area.

This statement, dated two weeks prior to the release of the White Paper, revealed clearly that the United States government was prepared to regard Communist power in China as evidence of Soviet expansion rather than indigenous revolution. The concept of containment had now penetrated Asia.

But this was only the beginning. Republican Congressmen who opened their assault on the Truman administration for its alleged loss of China accused the executive of undermining United States security by rendering all Asia vulnerable to Soviet ambition. Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, joined by other Republicans, charged that the State Department's White Paper was

to a large extent a 1,054 page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest with its ultimate threat to the peace of the world and our own national security.

If the purpose of American policy was the containment of communism the world over, they said, that policy should be applied to Asia as well as to Europe and the United States should give adequate military aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Similarly, Senator William



F. Knowland of California declared in September, 1949, that since communism was global in character

it did not make sense to try to keep 240,000,000 Europeans from being taken behind the Iron Curtain while we are complacent and unconcerned about 450,000,000 Chinese going the same way, when, if they should go that way, it would probably start an avalanche which would mean that a billion Asiatics would be lined up on the side of Soviet Russia and in the orbit of international communism.

The conflicting trends in official American thought—one accepting the indigenous, non-Soviet nature of the Chinese revolution, the other detecting Moscow's burgeoning influence in Chinese affairs—collided in Acheson's noted speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. Acheson explained the fall of Chiang in terms of an indigenous revolution.

What has happened [he said] . . . is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it.

Again the Secretary assured the nation that the Communist victory in China did not constitute a threat to the rest of Asia. He pointedly eliminated South Korea, Formosa and Southeast Asia from the United States defense perimeter. At the same time, Acheson recognized a Soviet power encroachment on China:

The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long antedates communism. . . . But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. These communistic concepts and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration.

That the Chinese had indeed become puppets of the Soviet Politburo appeared to pass beyond any shadow of doubt when, in February, 1950, the world read the terms of the new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. By its terms the Soviets promised China considerable financial and technical aid. Acheson admitted that the Chinese people might welcome such promises but, he added,

they will not fail, in time, to see where they fall short of China's real needs and desires. And they will wonder about the points upon which the agreements remain silent.

Acheson warned the Chinese that, whatever China's internal development, they would bring grave trouble on themselves and the rest of Asia "if they are led by their new rulers into aggressive or subversive adventures beyond their borders."

The concept of a single conspiracy, global in its pretensions and centering in Moscow, had not won universal acceptance. Indeed, many American scholars at mid-century rejected the notion completely. Journalist Walter Lippmann, speaking before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on February 22, 1950, reminded his audience:

While it is true that we have lost our power and for the time being most of our influence in China, it by no means follows that Russia has won control of China or has achieved an enduring alliance with China.

Most writers on Far Eastern subjects agreed with Acheson's warning of January that the United States should not introduce the use of military force into Asia. But the final Communist victory in China, added to the interpretation of the Sino-Soviet Pact which official Washington ascribed to it, propelled the administration logically toward the extension of the containment principle to include the Far East. By March, 1950, the Chinese revolution alone seemed sufficient to demonstrate Soviet expansionist tendencies toward Asia.

Secretary Acheson took the lead in defining the new challenge to Asia and in formulating the requirements of American policy in the Far East. When China appeared to be achieving true national independence, he told the California Commonwealth Club that her leaders were forcing her into the Soviet orbit.

We now face the prospect that the Communists may attempt to apply another familiar tactic and use China as a base for probing for other weak spots which they can move into and exploit.

He warned that the people of Asia

must face the fact that today the major threat to their freedom and to their social and economic

progress is the attempted penetration of Asia by Soviet-Communist imperialism and by the colonialism which it contains.

To meet this challenge of Communist aggression in Asia, Acheson stressed the importance of President Harry S. Truman's new program of military and economic aid to the free nations along the Chinese periphery—Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. United States officials in Asia joined Acheson in giving form and unity to this burgeoning concept of containment. Ambassador Loy W. Henderson admitted before the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi on March 27, 1950, that the United States naturally understood the culture of Europe better than that of Asia. Recent events in Asia, however, had given the American people a new and enlarging interest in the region.

It should be borne in mind . . . that the United States does not pursue one set of policies with regard to the Americas or Europe and another with regard to Asia. The foreign policies of the United States by force of circumstances have become global in character.

Upon his return to the United States, Ambassador Jessup, on April 13, gave a radio address to the nation. "I think most Americans realize," he declared in summary, "that Asia is important . . . because Soviet communism is clearly out to capture and colonize the continent." Addressing Congress on the subject of military assistance in June, 1950, President Truman made it clear that United States security hinged on the containment of Communist expansion in Asia. Military aid, he admitted, would not permit exactly the same results in Asia that it had achieved in Europe. Still, such aid was now essential to protect Asian and American interests. "The interests of the United States are global in character," the President repeated. "A threat to the peace of the world anywhere is a threat to our security."

## INDOCHINA

Much of the fear of further Soviet aggression eventually centered on Indochina where the French, as late as 1949, continued the

struggle for their Asian empire against the determined opposition of Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh. At one time the United States had supported Ho and as late as 1949 it had revealed no official interest in his defeat. Within the context of global containment, however, the fact that Ho was a Marxist and Moscow-trained made him sufficiently suspect as an agent of Soviet imperialism to bring the full weight of United States policy against him. What embarrassed United States containment policy in Indochina at mid-century was the French reluctance to grant the region its independence.

The French promised independence for Indochina in the Elysée Agreements of March, 1949. In June, the State Department welcomed the creation of the new state of Vietnam and expressed the hope that the March agreements would "form the basis for the progressive realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people." The United States accepted the new Vietnamese leader, Bao Dai, with enthusiasm as the nationalist answer to Ho Chi Minh. Meanwhile the French, conscious of the growing United States fear of Soviet expansion into Asia, insisted that they were fighting for Western security in the Far East and therefore deserved United States military aid. Only the refusal of the French National Assembly to ratify the Elysée Agreements stalled the French request for United States military support in Asia in late 1949.

The events of January and February, 1950, finally rendered Ho Chi Minh a mortal enemy of the United States. On January 14, to meet the challenge of Bao Dai and French policy, Ho declared the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under his control, as the only lawful government representative of the Vietnamese people. At the same time Ho announced that his country would

consolidate her friendly relations with the Soviet Union, China and other People's Democracies, actively to support the national liberation movements of colonial and semi-colonial countries. . . .

Before the end of the month both China and the U.S.S.R. had recognized the Democratic

Republic. In a press release, Acheson declared that this

should remove any illusion as to the "nationalist" character of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina.

Eventually, the French Assembly ratified the agreements which established the new state of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia as independent states within the French Union. On February 6, 1950, Ambassador Jessup declared in Singapore that the United States would view any armed Communist aggression against the new states of Indochina as a matter of grave concern. On the following day, the United States and Great Britain extended *de jure* recognition to the three Associated States of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, and sent a note of congratulations to Bao Dai, the chief of the new Vietnam state. The notion that Bao Dai had better claims to Vietnamese leadership than Ho and that he would ultimately triumph became official doctrine in Washington. Loy Henderson expressed it well when he said

The United States is convinced that the Bao Dai Government of Viet Nam reflects more accurately than any rival claimants to power in Viet Nam the nationalist aspirations of the people of that country. It hopes by its policies with regard to Viet Nam, to contribute to the peaceful progress of Vietnamese people toward the realization of the fruits of self-government. . . . My government is convinced that any movement headed by a Moscow-recognized Communist such as Ho Chi Minh must be in the direction of subservience to a foreign state, not in that of independence and self-government.

Still the United States faced a dilemma in Indochina which belied its stated faith in either Bao Dai or the French. To give military aid to the French would lend additional credence to the charge that United States policy in Asia was primarily military and strategic with little or no genuine concern for the political advancement of the Vietnamese people. To channel aid to the government in Saigon, with Bao Dai spending his time at Dalat far removed from the activities of his government, gave no promise of effective

utilization at all. Finally on May 8, 1950, Acheson, with French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, negotiated an arrangement whereby France and the governments of Indochina together would carry the responsibility for Indochinese security and development. United States aid would simply contribute to that objective.

Again the motives of containment were clear.

The United States Government [wrote Acheson] convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

In his request to Congress for military assistance funds in June, President Truman acknowledged the nation's determination "to preserve the freedom and integrity of Indochina from the Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh." In December, 1950, the United States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with France, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos for indirect United States military aid to the three states of Indochina.

## THE IMPACT OF KOREA

Late in June, 1950, the Asian containment policies of the United States required a commitment of ground forces to prevent a Communist-led country from erasing its boundary with a non-Communist neighbor. Within the context of the recent conceptualization of Communist aggression in Asia, the rationale for United States involvement in Korea was obvious enough. The immediate concern of the Truman administration was the defense of a small Asian nation against external aggression. But more than the independence of South Korea was at stake. To the Truman administration, the North Korean invasion of South Korea was proof of Soviet imperialistic designs on Asia.

The attack upon the Republic of Korea [said the President on July 19] makes it plain beyond all doubt that the international Communist

movement is prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. We must, therefore, recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas.

Similarly, State Department adviser John Foster Dulles, in a radio interview July 1, assured the nation that the North Koreans did not attack "purely on their own but as part of the world strategy of international communism." To meet this challenge of Soviet aggression the President ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to defend the island of Formosa and speeded up military assistance to Indochina and the Philippines.

United States officials, in attributing the Korean War to Soviet imperialism, placed enormous faith in the Chinese refusal to become involved. This, hopefully, would demonstrate China's ability to withstand the demands of the Kremlin. Acheson revealed his confidence in the good judgment and resistance of the Chinese nation in a telecast of mid-September. For the Chinese to enter the war, he said, would be sheer madness. Similarly, Texas Senator Tom Connally, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, pointed to the logic of Chinese abstinence from involvement in the Korean War. Mao Tse-tung, he said,

must know all about Russian ambitions in the Far East. He must know the master planners in the Kremlin would like to dismember his country. He must know it would be folly for China to yield to Communist pressures and to war against the free countries which have always been friends of the Chinese people.

At Wake Island, in October, General Douglas MacArthur, leading the United Nations forces in Korea, assured the President that China would not enter the Korean War. Such expressions of hope proved to be a poor prediction of the future. But they explain why the Chinese advance across the Yalu in November, 1950, produced a traumatic reaction among Washington officials. The international Communist movement, it now seemed clear, gave the U.S.S.R. not only its fundamental design but also its fantastic power.

All governments which are now free and all re-

sponsible citizens of free societies [warned Acheson] must face, with a sense of urgency, the capabilities for conquest and destruction in the hands of the rulers of the Soviet Union.

If the new attack in Korea were successful, ran a White House press release in December, 1950, "we can expect it to spread through Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival." With the Soviets in control of China, where would aggression end?

It was left for Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State, to carry the notion of Soviet aggression in the Far East to its final conceptualization. To achieve its ultimate success, they agreed, the Soviet Communist program of world conquest required the amalgamation of China's millions.

To this end [Dulles informed a New York audience in May, 1951] a Chinese Communist party was formed under the guiding direction of the Russian, Borodin. That party, Soviet Russia has nurtured until it has matured into today's regime of Mao Tse-tung which serves as the instrument of Soviet communism."

Certainly, he said, the Soviet government would not have paid so great a price to bring the Chinese Communists to power unless it intended to serve the Russian interest thereby.

By the test of conception, birth, nurture, and obedience [Dulles concluded] the Mao Tse-tung regime is a creature of the Moscow Politburo, and it is in behalf of Moscow, not of China, that it is destroying the friendship of the Chinese people toward the United States.

Ostensibly the Chinese Communists had whipped up anti-American sentiment in the interest of national independence. But actually, Dulles informed his listeners, the hysteria was merely the front behind which the Chinese people were "being betrayed into amalgamation with the mass which serves Moscow."

The pattern of Soviet conquest now appeared equally clear elsewhere in Asia. Disturbances throughout the Pacific and Asian areas, from the war in Korea to the activities of the Communist-controlled United States maritime unions, said Dulles, were



part of a single pattern . . . of violence planned and plotted for 25 years and finally brought to a consummation of fighting and disorder in the whole vast area extending from Korea down through China into Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, and west into Tibet and the borders of Burma, India, and Pakistan.

Rusk noted in February, 1951, that the year 1950 marked a new phase in the Soviet Union's aggressive policy.

First [he said] it has clearly shown that it is prepared to wage war by satellites so far as that becomes desirable to further its objectives—not only wars by small satellites such as the North Koreans, but full-fledged war by Communist China, a major satellite. Second, the Soviet Union has shown that it is itself prepared to risk a general war and that it is pushing its program to the brink of a general war.

During 1951, much of the official American concern focused on Southeast Asia where, said Rusk in November, the real issue was whether the people of Indochina would be permitted to work out their own future or “whether they will be subjected to a Communist reign of terror and be absorbed by force into the new colonialism of a Soviet Communist empire.” Meanwhile the French, increasingly hard pressed in Indochina, supported their claims to additional United States aid by insisting that they were as much involved in fighting international communism there as was the United States in Korea. The Truman administration strengthened its Asian containment policy with a new Japanese treaty designed to rebuild Japan into a strong nation; new alliances with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand; and larger commitments of military aid for the French and the Associated States of Indochina as they carried the chief burden of containment in Southeast Asia.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, Washington officials pushed United States rearmament in Europe and Asia with a greater sense of urgency under the assumption that the non-Soviet world had entered a period of great peril and had only a short time to prepare before the enemy reached the peak of its power. In the President's budget message of 1951, military aid became an es-

tablished policy of the United States. The first Mutual Security Act, adopted that year, implied that thereafter economic aid would be used primarily to expand the military base of the recipient countries.

During 1952, military assistance to Asia grew in importance relative to Europe. The bulk of the military aid channeled into Asia went to four countries regarded as especially vulnerable to Soviet-Chinese aggression: the Republic of China on Formosa, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Vietnam and Japan. In Korea, the United States supported one of the largest non-Communist armies in the world at a cost of almost \$1 billion per year. In Indochina, the United States eventually underwrote 80 per cent of the financial cost of the French effort.

That the globalization of containment would produce diminishing returns was evident even as the policy unfolded. Containment in Europe had promised success because the threat was purely military—the danger of a Red Army marching westward. The region guaranteed by NATO, moreover, comprised the seat of an ancient civilization with a tradition of political, economic and military efficiency. In Asia and the Middle East, the danger was less that of marching armies than of guerrilla warfare and subversion. This reduced containment to a matter of political, not military, effectiveness. For no government that failed to establish a broad governing base would long remain in power whatever moral and physical support it received from the United States.

Even as a venture in power, containment in Asia was prejudiced from the start. Unlike the nations of Europe, the Asian nations  
(Continued on page 115)

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*Analyzing United States military commitments in Asia during the Eisenhower years, this author notes that "In retrospect, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has been accused of 'pactomania' because of his preoccupation with treaties to deal with the Communist threat in the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific."*

## The Eisenhower Era in Asia

BY ALVIN J. COTTRELL

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THE UNITED STATES commitment in Asia, as defined by the Eisenhower administration, appears in clearer perspective if the behavior of that administration is considered during the various crises that confronted it.\*

Any discussion of the administration's military commitments in Asia should logically begin with the Korean War. Popular support for that war had dwindled as the conflict dragged on. Dwight D. Eisenhower had campaigned for the presidency while the United States was still heavily committed in Korea. He had made this commitment a major issue of his campaign, promising that if elected he "would go to Korea." In office, he exploited his overwhelming electoral victory to settle the increasingly unpopular conflict at the 38th parallel.

After the settlement of the Korean War, the Communist effort in Asia shifted to Indochina, where the French had been fighting since 1947. With the dramatic Communist victory over the French at Dienbienphu in 1954, the Eisenhower administration was faced with a new dilemma. There was strong sentiment in the high echelons of the admin-

istration in favor of United States military intervention in Indochina. There were proposals for the application of United States air and naval power. Despite these pressures, President Eisenhower finally decided against intervention, apparently due largely to the advice of General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Ridgway believed that, while for the most part only the use of air and naval forces was being advocated, any such commitment would soon be broadened to include ground forces. As he noted in his *Memoirs*,

In Korea we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either.

I lost no time in having [such a report] passed up the chain of command. It reached President Eisenhower. To a man of his military experience, its implications were clear. The idea of intervening was abandoned. . . .<sup>1</sup>

General Ridgway, in fact, went directly to the President over the head of Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is important to bear in mind that Eisenhower accepted Ridgway's position when United States military forces were at their peak of post-World War II mobilization. Eisenhower's decision not to intervene was undoubtedly greatly influenced by the lack of public support for such an intervention, following in the wake of the Korean War.

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\*The author wishes to thank Arthur Collingsworth for his assistance in preparing this article for publication.

<sup>1</sup> *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 276.

This became clear when the then Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, hinted at intervention in a "trial balloon" speech which drew little support from Congress or the nation.

## SEATO

In its first formal response to the French defeat in Indochina, the United States sponsored the Manila Conference in September, 1954. At this conference, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded to help cope with Communist threats to Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. Also included in the area covered by the treaty were the so-called protocol states of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia (Cambodia later withdrew as a protocol state).<sup>2</sup>

The signatories to SEATO were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. The commitment of the signatories under the treaty was, and continues to be, extremely weak. The treaty calls for consultation and agreement on the measures to be taken; any action is to be taken in accordance with each nation's constitutional procedures. Unanimous agreement is required even to designate an attack endangering the peace of any nation in the area.

In late 1954, Eisenhower committed the United States to economic assistance for the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. In a speech before the National Student Association at the University of Maryland on August 15, 1967, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy revealed that without any official statement early in 1955, the United States had begun

to take over the job of military assistance to South Vietnam, acting within the numerical and equipment limitations stated in the Geneva accords for foreign military aid.<sup>3</sup>

Bundy referred to the SEATO Treaty and to United States economic and military assistance as major commitments. However, it

should be noted that the commitments need not have been "open ended." Certainly the language of the SEATO treaty and the amount of assistance originally provided for South Vietnam left open the degree of involvement the United States might eventually be required to undertake.

Among the areas not covered by SEATO were those in "the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude." This excluded Formosa, the Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu, and Hong Kong, as well as the other territories to the north. In December, 1954, the United States signed a bilateral mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in which

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

## THE FORMOSA RESOLUTION

In 1954, the Chinese had begun to threaten the offshore islands and to talk about the "liberation of Formosa" (Taiwan). Faced with a decision about the defense of the offshore islands, President Eisenhower requested emergency authority from Congress in January, 1955, to protect Formosa and the Pescadores from potential Chinese aggression. Congress responded on January 29 by approving a resolution that gave him wide latitude to deal with the threat, by a vote of 85 to 3 in the Senate and 410 to 3 in the House of Representatives. The resolution authorized the President:

to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuming the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Although Quemoy and Matsu were not specifically mentioned, they could be included if Eisenhower determined that an attack on them was merely a prelude to an attack on Formosa. Nor did the resolution preclude

<sup>2</sup> For excerpts from this treaty, see p. 113 of this issue.

<sup>3</sup> "The path to Viet Nam: A Lesson in Involvement," The Department of State Publication 8295, East Asian and Pacific Series, September, 1967, p. 3.

action against the mainland if a similar determination were made about Chinese military activity there. On March 3, 1955, the bilateral mutual security pact with the Republic of China went into effect. As Eisenhower wrote in his *Mandate for Change*:

The two documents left no doubt about U.S. intentions toward Formosa and the Pescadores; in that region we would not be in the . . . situation we had faced in the 1950 Korean Crisis.<sup>4</sup>

Throughout this period, Eisenhower was under great pressure from members of his administration and from some congressmen to take strong action against the Chinese Communists. According to his own account of a September, 1954, meeting of his top foreign policy and military advisers on the crisis,

There were military reasons, Admiral Radford contended, for defending the offshore islands. . . . Admiral Carney and General Twining therefore urged that the Chinese Nationalists bomb the mainland. With this conclusion I disagreed. Such a course, I said, we could not confine to Quemoy Island. "We're not talking now about a limited war, brushfire war. We're talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If we attack China, we're not going to impose limits on our military action as in Korea."

Much of Eisenhower's attitude toward a large United States military commitment in Asia is revealed in this statement. It is clear that he was not persuaded by some of the more "sophisticated" theories involving the graduated application of force. He clearly believed that the United States should be prepared in a given situation either to apply as much military force as necessary or to take only the most limited military action.

## MASSIVE RETALIATION

The doctrine of "massive retaliation" became the strategic concept synonymous with the Eisenhower approach to military policy. The term first appeared in a statement to the Council on Foreign Relations by Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles on January 12, 1954, less than a year after the end of the Korean War and while the conflict in Indochina was still in progress. In the speech, Dulles stated that, in the future, the United States would respond to challenges "at places and with means of its own choosing." He argued that the United States must rely more heavily on its "massive retaliatory power." Analyzing the address, naval historian Bernard Brodie observed:

One notices . . . that this speech, presented only a half-year after the armistice which ended the Korean War, was a rejection, on tactical and strategic grounds, of our entire strategy in that war. The war had been limited with respect to weapons and geography and, as a limited war, it had to be waged at a place determined by the enemy and peripheral to the sources of his power.<sup>5</sup>

In other words, Secretary Dulles was suggesting that henceforth if the enemy—the Chinese Communists for example—attacked some point on the periphery of Asia, the United States might respond not by meeting them there on a battlefield favoring them but, instead, by invoking its massive retaliatory power.

According to Brodie,

Thus the Secretary fairly explicitly condemned the scope and methods of Korea as intolerably wasteful and unsatisfactory. . . . In fact, the speech makes no sense, *except* as a rejection of Korea, because otherwise its timing—four years after the first Soviet atomic bomb and some months after the Soviet Union had already exploded a thermonuclear weapon—is a little bizarre.<sup>6</sup>

The doctrine of massive retaliation came under severe criticism from many sources. One of the pioneer writers on deterrence in the nuclear age, W. W. Kaufmann, wrote, in a famous and highly perceptive critique of the doctrine, that:

. . . the minimum requirements of credibility have not been fulfilled by the doctrine of massive retaliation. What is more, the possibility exists that the Soviet Union and Red China, instead of being deterred, would continue to act as they did in Indo-China and actually push into other peripheral areas, not only for gain but also for the purposes of discovering what constitutes the limits of our tolerance.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: 1953-56* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 469.

<sup>5</sup> *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 250-51.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

<sup>7</sup> W. W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 24.



Kaufmann, like many other critics of "massive retaliation," argued for larger conventional forces in order to give greater credibility to the United States willingness to intervene. As he put it:

If we show a willingness and ability to intervene with great conventional power on the peripheral areas, after the manner of Korea, we will have a reasonable chance of forestalling enemy military action there.<sup>8</sup>

This argument was characteristic of the criticism of the Dulles-Eisenhower strategy. Still, today when one looks back to the situation in Asia confronting the Eisenhower administration as it assumed office, the doctrine made considerable sense, despite its deficiencies for meeting the full spectrum of potential conflict. It was a psychological and declaratory policy rather than an actual operational concept of military strategy. Yet some such doctrine was needed if the United States were to try to deter further local military aggression in Asia and to compensate for the lack of the requisite will to undertake military commitments.

In short, with the memories of the costly stalemate in Korea and the French defeat in Indochina still strong in their minds, the military planners sought to head off what they regarded as the inexorable drift of United States global policy, particularly in Asia: the debilitating drainage of United States military resources in direct engagement with an enemy who possessed a decisive superiority in manpower and sharp advantages of geography and logistics. In fact, former Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, with his usual candor, argued that the result of the war in Indochina would not have been different if the United States Army had been "twice as big as it is, if the Navy had twice as many ships afloat, and the Air Force had 200 wings. . . ."<sup>9</sup>

## A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE

The solution for the Eisenhower administration seemed to lie in the realm of a strategy

of deterrence rather than in graduated counterforce responses. During Eisenhower's term of office, the United States military advisory group in Vietnam numbered well under a thousand. The United States manpower commitment escalated only after he left office. Indeed, even in Europe he continued to the very end to advocate a reduced American ground presence in NATO, e.g., he suggested that the United States military presence should be reduced to two divisions as an earnest of the United States commitment to defend Europe. This was consistent with his essentially deterrent-oriented philosophy. On the other hand, many critics of the doctrine of massive retaliation propounded theories envisaging the graduated application of force which have been employed with only limited success. Whatever position one may have taken on the propriety of United States initial involvement in Vietnam, it is clear that the protracted, yet limited, application of a large military force in Vietnam has been disastrous; not only there, but also for the effect it seems likely to have on the United States ability to enter into future military commitments elsewhere.

The fact remains that, with the exception of Vietnam where the war was already in progress, the Eisenhower strategy for Asia did not require United States intervention. At the same time the ambiguity of the Eisenhower military commitment in Asia undoubtedly was more realistic, given the lack of support for direct intervention, than any attempt to spell

(Continued on page 117)

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>9</sup> See Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, "Fashions in Strategy," *Army*, February, 1963, p. 44.

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*"It is not fair to argue on the basis of Vietnam that the United States actively sought the role of 'policeman' in Southeast Asia in the years 1960-1968. It intervened in Vietnam reluctantly because, rightly or wrongly, it saw no alternative."*

## Growing Involvement in Asia: 1960-1968

BY RICHARD BUTWELL

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THE SECOND VIETNAMESE war had just begun when John Fitzgerald Kennedy was inaugurated as the thirty-fifth President of the United States. Only in 1960, the year of Kennedy's election, did Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese Communist government publicly proclaim its intention to "liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." Early in 1961, the formation of the National Liberation Front as the political arm of the Vietcong insurgents was announced. The Vietcong's resort to violence to topple the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem followed the refusal of Diem's government and of the United States to allow the all-Vietnam elections that were provided for in the 1954 Geneva Accords.

Not a single American serviceman had lost his life in the war in Vietnam before Kennedy's inauguration. At the start of the 1960's, moreover, there were only 327 military advisers attached to the United States military assistance advisory group in Vietnam, which had been created in 1955. The number of American service personnel in Vietnam was more than slightly doubled by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the last year of his administration; when Kennedy became President, there were 685 such advisers in Vietnam.

However, President Eisenhower had made a commitment to South Vietnam in the first year of the Diem regime in 1954. Eisenhower

had promised that the United States would assist the Saigon government in "developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." The small United States military advisory group was sent to Vietnam in partial fulfillment of this pledge, as was United States aid to the Diem regime in the amount of \$1.4 billion through the Eisenhower years. But the Eisenhower commitment—later to be cited by President Lyndon B. Johnson in justification of his Vietnam policy—was to help the South Vietnamese to become strong enough to resist subversion and aggression. Eisenhower never pledged the United States to fight in Vietnam. Actually, United States involvement in Vietnam had begun in the Truman years, when the Bao Dai regime had been recognized. But the commitment inherited by President Kennedy by no means required the mammoth United States military participation in Vietnam in the 1960's.

### THE KENNEDY YEARS

Vietnam was not a major issue in the 1960 campaign in which Kennedy defeated Republican nominee Richard M. Nixon for the presidency. There was no public debate—or substantial public opinion—about Vietnam, which was still altogether unknown to most Americans. Nor was the mounting contest between the Communists and the Diem government to be Kennedy's first major foreign

policy problem in Southeast Asia. This was to focus on Laos, and not on Vietnam. Resentment had been growing in various quarters in Laos in the late 1950's with the blatantly pro-American posture of the Vientiane government. In August, 1960, young paratrooper Captain Kong Le surprised even the United States military advisers in that landlocked formerly French-ruled country. Kong Le demanded the resumption of a foreign policy of neutralism, as stipulated by the 1954 Geneva settlement, and the return to the premiership of neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma. The non-Communists were badly split by this action, and the neutralists joined with the insurgent Communist Pathet Lao (already supported by North Vietnam) in a civil war that turned increasingly against the pro-United States conservatives led by Premier—and Prince—Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan. In a dramatic March, 1961, television appearance President Kennedy, only two months in office, clearly threatened United States military intervention in Laos if the Communists did not halt their military action against the Vientiane government.<sup>1</sup> The annual ministerial meeting of SEATO, held shortly thereafter, considered joint intervention but took no action.<sup>2</sup> This was partly because of disagreement among the member states and partly because the Vientiane government never requested intervention. Such a request was a prerequisite for invoking pledged SEATO protection for Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam, all non-members of the alliance.

Given the choice of uninvited and essentially unilateral intervention, or acquiescence in a political settlement, the Kennedy administration chose the latter. A second Geneva conference opened in May, 1961, only two months after Kennedy's televised warning to

the Communists, but it was not until July, 1962—14 months later—that a settlement was formalized. The delay was due to the inability of the feuding Lao factions to agree on internal governing arrangements.

The Laos crisis of 1961–1962 was apparently perceived by President Kennedy and most of his advisers as more serious than the continuing conflict in adjacent Vietnam. There was a respect for South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and a belief in the viability of his leadership that had no counterpart in the United States perception of Lao leaders Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan. The anti-Communist Lao military forces, moreover, were literally being routed by the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao Communists and Kong Le's neutralist military faction. The United States did not intervene militarily in Laos in 1961–1962 because it did not believe that the pro-American Lao faction had the requisite political strength to govern the country and because President Kennedy ultimately decided against military intervention that would commit United States forces to a war in which they might become dangerously bogged down.

President Kennedy spoke strongly against Communist North Vietnamese intervention in Laos in 1961, but at no time did he term Laos vital to the security of the United States. However, for Thailand, which was probably the most important military ally of the United States in Southeast Asia, Laos was vital.<sup>3</sup> Many of the inhabitants of the long neglected, underdeveloped northeastern part of Thailand were either so-called "left-bank Lao," more closely related to the inhabitants of neighboring Laos than to the Thai, or Vietnamese refugees from the 1946–1954 Franco-Viet Minh war who were almost all pro-Hanoi. Lowland western Laos, moreover, lay just across the Mekong River from Thailand. The Thai had joined SEATO in 1954 and had welcomed the establishment of its headquarters and secretariat in their capital city of Bangkok because of their fear of Communist aggression from China or Vietnam. Thailand had favored military intervention in Laos in 1961, and it may be that Lao reluctance to

<sup>1</sup> See Roger Hilsman, *To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 131.

<sup>2</sup> See Bernard B. Fall, *Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960–61* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), pp. 216–218.

<sup>3</sup> See Hugh Toye, *Laos: Buffer State or Battleground* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 183.

request such aid had its roots partly in a fear that the country would become a Thai protectorate as a result, an indication of the persistence of historically rooted animosities among the countries of mainland Southeast Asia.

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Thailand in 1961 but found the Thai opposed to the stationing of United States forces on their soil. In March, 1962, however, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman agreed to an interpretation of the 1954 Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty that transformed the multilateral United States-Thai defense relationship within SEATO into a bilateral pledge by the United States to honor its SEATO obligation to Thailand, with or without the acquiescence of the other members of the security pact. The Thai, fearful that the other SEATO partners might disagree in a future crisis, sought a direct defense pledge from the United States. This major alteration of the military relationship between the two countries was effected wholly by the executive branch of the United States government. In effect, without Senate authorization, President Kennedy transformed a multilateral treaty ratified by the Senate during the Eisenhower administration into a bilateral defense pact between the United States and Thailand. Shortly thereafter, in May, 1962, the first United States forces arrived in Thailand as a symbol of the United States intention to ensure the continued independence and territorial integrity of Thailand.<sup>4</sup> The subsequent United States military buildup in Thailand, however—which was to reach 48,000 service personnel, mostly airmen, by the end of the Johnson administration—was to be almost wholly a result of the developing military situation in Vietnam.

#### VIETNAM: A POLITICAL PROBLEM

The objective of the Communists in South Vietnam has always been the overthrow of the various anti-Communist elites which have

governed the country since the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam in 1954. Probably the single most important factor that occasioned large-scale United States military intervention in 1965 was the failure of the Diem government to provide the quality of leadership required to counter the Communist assault. Diem proved incapable of rallying his countrymen against the Communists. He relied increasingly on United States help, economic and military, as a substitute for the political and military measures that could be taken only by indigenous leadership. Indeed, he further fragmented the non-Communists by his high-handed and insensitive responses to the demands of his country's Buddhist majority.

President Kennedy ultimately recognized the shortcomings of Diem's leadership and, in a televised interview on Labor Day, 1963, he suggested the need for a change of leadership in South Vietnam. This cue was not missed by various South Vietnamese officers, and Diem was out and murdered within two months. The nine governments that followed before the emergence of Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky in June, 1965, proved even less capable of leading the country. The assassination of President Kennedy, moreover, brought to the formation of American foreign policy the less experienced hands of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

#### ESCALATION

United States military escalation, though greatly speeded up under President Johnson, had begun during the Kennedy years. The number of United States servicemen in Vietnam increased nearly four-fold in 1961, the first year of the Kennedy administration, amounting to 3,025 men by the year's end. Late in October of the same year, Kennedy sent General Maxwell D. Taylor and Walt W. Rostow on a special mission to Vietnam to make recommendations respecting United States policy in the light of the worsening war. Taylor and Rostow recommended the initial dispatch of 10,000 regular United States ground troops to Vietnam—sufficiently disguised as to their duties to avoid an open vio-

<sup>4</sup> Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 239.

lation of the 1954 Geneva Accords which prohibited the introduction of foreign troops. President Kennedy rejected the recommendation that combat troops be sent to Vietnam, but he increased the number of United States military "advisers" in the country to 11,300 by the end of 1962. Approximately 16,000 such servicemen, bolstered by an increment of 5,000 military personnel in the first ten months of 1963, were stationed in Vietnam when Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded President Kennedy in November, 1963. Some of these men were accompanying South Vietnamese pilots on combat missions, allegedly in their training capacity, while others flew helicopters on various kinds of missions in combat zones. The number of United States servicemen was still comparatively modest at the end of the less than three years of Kennedy's leadership, but they had been increased 24-fold since the Eisenhower era.

In the half-decade from November, 1963, to November, 1968, when President Johnson stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, the number of American fighting men in South Vietnam increased another 30-fold, from approximately 16,000 to nearly 550,000 men. In the spring of 1968, moreover, President Johnson received a recommendation from some of his military advisers to increase the size of this contingent by almost another 50 per cent. In the first year of the Johnson administration, the increase was from 16,000 to 23,000 men; United States forces in Vietnam were increased by 161,000 in 1965, 205,000 in 1966, 102,000 in 1967, and 63,000 in 1968, despite the beginning of peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam in that year. In addition to these forces 48,000 United States servicemen were stationed in nearby Thailand, primarily engaged in flying and servicing bombing missions over North Vietnam and Laos, while there were nearly 37,000 men aboard United States naval ships in or near Vietnamese coastal waters.

In 1964, on the eve of this military escalation, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara

had denied that the South Vietnamese and, by inference, the Americans were losing the war. President Johnson also stated in 1964, an election year, that it was not his view that "we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys." But by the end of the next year there were already more than 185,000 United States troops involved in the fighting in Vietnam. How could the American leadership have been so mistaken? Or were President Johnson and his chief advisers deliberately misleading the American people?

Politics by definition almost always involves more than a little public deception, but self-deception seems to have been a much more important factor in these miscalculations. According to Eric F. Goldman, intellectual-in-residence in the White House early in the Johnson incumbency, the President apparently believed that, with the large-scale commitment of United States forces to the struggle, the war would be over in 12 to 18 months.<sup>5</sup> This was only one miscalculation, however, and possibly not the most important one. President Johnson and his advisers also believed that the introduction of external military power could ultimately prove decisive in what was basically an internal struggle for political ascendancy. The second Vietnamese war was very much a political war. Since 1954, two rival elites—one Communist, the other an assorted mixture of non-Communists—had been jockeying for power to fill the vacuum created by the termination of French colonial rule. The first guerrillas in South Vietnam in the late 1950's had been South Vietnamese. Unlike the United States military "advisers" of the years preceding 1965, these southerners did not primarily represent an attempt to circumvent the Geneva Accords. Political considerations were ever uppermost in their minds. They had the distinct advantage, moreover, of being Vietnamese, not Europeans.

The first United States combat troops, 3,500 United States Marines, went ashore in Vietnam in March, 1965, less than six months after President Johnson's overwhelming election triumph. The landing of the Marines came several months after the introduction of

<sup>5</sup> *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), reprinted in *The Evening Star* (Washington, D.C.), April 14, 1969.



the first North Vietnamese troops into the war in South Vietnam, and one month after the inauguration of sustained United States air attacks on North Vietnamese cities and military positions. The bombing of North Vietnam was directly related to the August, 1964, incident in the Gulf of Tonkin in which United States destroyers were apparently attacked by North Vietnamese gunboats. It may be that the Johnson administration was waiting for some such dramatic development to justify intensified military activity against North Vietnam.

The United States Congress, acting hastily, authorized President Johnson to take any measures he felt necessary to repel armed attack.<sup>6</sup> Johnson ordered the sustained bombing of North Vietnam in February, 1965, within the context of this authorization. The bombing continued until March, 1968, when the President limited air action to the area south of the 20th parallel. This move was followed by the opening of preliminary peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam in Paris in May. Bombing was stopped altogether on November 1, 1968, as a United States concession to bring about expanded negotiations in Paris involving the South Vietnamese government and the insurgent National Liberation Front.

The bombing of North Vietnam and the general United States military escalation have subsequently been much criticized at home and abroad although criticism is less severe in Southeast Asia than in the United States or West Europe. Although the Vietnamese Communists were denied victory in the southern half of their divided country during the decade of the 1960's, there is a strong likelihood that they will attain their aim by political means in the 1970's. If this is the case, the question can validly be asked whether it was necessary to sacrifice more than 34,000 American lives in Vietnam. Even as late as the spring of 1964, the Johnson administration might still have refrained from large-

scale troop commitments and the bombing of North Vietnam. Why, then, did President Johnson take such action?

There are different ways of answering this question because different decisions were taken at different times. The basic strategic decisions to commit large numbers of United States ground troops and to bomb North Vietnam were taken in hasty response to a rapidly worsening military situation in the late months of 1964 and in early 1965. The United States could have decided that Vietnam was not worth a greater investment in lives and money, but its far from accurate image of Communist Vietnamese capabilities blinded it to the political and psychological strength of its adversary.

President Johnson believed that the war could be ended well before the 1968 election. The exaggerated image held by Johnson and by his chief military and political advisers of the United States capacity to turn the tide of battle was probably the major factor in the decision not to establish enclaves in defense of the heavily populated parts of the country. The United States initially escalated the war in Vietnam in 1965 in the mistaken belief that a fairly modest number of American troops—far fewer than the half million men ultimately committed to the conflict—would markedly shorten the war.

The considerable escalation of the military involvement in the years after 1965 was designed to improve the anti-Communists' position and to enable them to control the terms of a political settlement. The Johnson administration did not really pursue a political settlement in 1966 because its military position would not have served it well in the event

(Continued on page 116)

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**Richard Butwell** has lived in Burma and the Philippines. He is the author of many books on Asian affairs, among them *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), *Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Praeger, 1964), and most recently *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966), with coauthor Amry Vandenbosch.

<sup>6</sup> See *The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incidents*, Part II (Washington, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1968), pp. 1-2. For excerpts from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, see p. 113 of this issue.

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*Noting that "present and future United States military commitments in Asia are a matter of foreign policy and not a question of 'legal' obligations," this specialist declares that "In Asia, American sympathies, American humanitarianism, American adherence to 'moral' obligations have often led to unhappy and tragic military commitments."*

## Commitments in Asia: 1969

BY WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE

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WHEN UNITED STATES Air Force Major-General James B. Knapp met with North Korean representatives at Panmunjom on April 18, 1969, to protest the shooting down of a United States navy spy plane by North Korean fighters, he appeared not solely as a representative of the United States but as Senior United Nations member of the U.N. Armistice Commission. The 50,000 United States troops stationed in South Korea are not required by our defense treaty with that country, but are there to enforce the armistice agreement concluded in 1953 on behalf of the United Nations. In August, 1953, after the armistice had been signed, the 16 nations who had furnished military forces to the U.N. command during the Korean war issued a statement pledging themselves to renew the war if Communist aggression again occurred. They warned that in the event of renewed warfare, "in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea." Thus, the United States has a basic commitment under the United Nations to defend South Korea from attack by the North Korean Communists.

This military commitment under the U.N. is reinforced by the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty signed on October 1, 1953. This treaty is similar to that signed with the Philippines on August

30, 1951. It obligates the Republic of Korea and the United States first, to develop their capacity to resist armed attack; second, to consult, if their territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened in the Pacific; and third, to take appropriate action if either party is the object of an "armed attack" in the Pacific area. Article V provides that the "armed attack" referred to shall include not only an attack on the metropolitan territories of either South Korea or the United States but also on "island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."

Article III, however, provides that if an armed attack on either party to the treaty in territories now under their respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as brought under the administrative control of the other, endangers its own peace and safety, each party will act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

This provision was added to preclude any *automatic* military support for a South Korean-initiated attack on North Korea—territory claimed by the Republic of Korea, but not under its administrative control. In Article IV, the United States is granted the right to dispose its land, sea and air forces in and about the Republic of Korea.

This mutual defense treaty, therefore, reinforced the United States military com-

mitment to defend South Korea incurred under United Nations auspices. This treaty also provided the legal basis for the Republic of Korea agreeing to send 50,000 troops to South Vietnam to assist the United States armed forces there which were "under attack."<sup>1</sup> Because the division of Korea into two hostile states is provisional under the armistice terms and because all efforts to arrange a conference for a permanent solution have so far failed, it would seem that the United States military commitment to defend South Korea is an indefinite one. Now and in the future, the United States must make proper disposition of its forces in the Asian-Pacific area so as to be able to meet this obligation in terms of the extent and nature of any future armed attack by North Korean forces or even by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

## JAPAN

The United States undertook the occupation of Japan after World War II as a temporary measure to ensure Japanese disarmament and the reduction of Japan's military power. In the Japanese constitution engineered during the occupation, Article IX included the so-called "no war" clause which stipulates that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." It does provide, however, for the development of "self-defense" forces which now include land, sea and air forces with a total of 250,000 men.

In the negotiations with the Japanese on the peace treaty, the United States recognized an obligation to defend Japan and the United States-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Mutual Security, signed on September 8, 1951, attempts to take care of Japan's special relationship with the United States. The treaty obligates Japan to live peacefully with other nations and "to settle disputes with other nations by amicable means." It is expressly stipulated, however, that this does not deprive Japan of "the right of individual and

collective self-defense." The preamble to this treaty expressed the hope that Japan will "increasingly assume responsibility for her own defense."

Unlike mutual defense treaties signed with Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines just prior to the peace treaty with Japan, there is no reciprocal obligation on Japan's part to help defend any United States territory or attacks on United States armed forces, aircraft or public vessels in the Pacific, and there is no mutual obligation by the parties to develop their military ability to resist armed attack. The treaty does provide, first, that the United States has the right to dispose its land, sea and air forces in and about Japan and that these forces may be used not only to protect Japan from external attack, but also "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." Second, Japan is obligated not to grant bases or military facilities to any third power without United States consent. Foreseeing changed circumstances, this treaty was called "provisional" and subject to renegotiation at a later date by mutual agreement.

On January 19, 1960, Japan and the United States signed a revised security treaty. This new treaty has several significant changes from the first one. The original treaty did not specifically obligate the United States to assist Japan in case of an armed attack on her territory, although it was assumed the United States would do so. The revised treaty states that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that each party would act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes." Thus, the United States is obliged to come to Japan's assistance if Japan's territory is attacked, but Japan is not obliged to assist the United States in case of attack on United States territory, ships or aircraft.

Article IV provides explicit Japanese assent to the disposition of United States land, sea and air forces in and about Japan, but unlike the first treaty, this is not a "right" of the

<sup>1</sup> There is some question as to whether the Republic of Korea violated its constitution in sending combat forces to South Vietnam.

United States. Nor does this treaty deny Japan the right to make similar concessions to a third power. A clause in the previous treaty permitting the United States to use its armed forces "to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances" was eliminated. The revised treaty also adds that the two parties undertake to develop their capacity for self-defense within the framework of their respective constitutions. Finally, and most important, this treaty has a ten-year expiration date so that by January 19, 1970, it must either be extended by mutual consent, be left to expire, or be renegotiated.

Thus, the present military commitment of the United States to Japan is clear. We are obligated to defend Japan against external attack, but since this treaty obligation expires in January, 1970, it is difficult to predict the nature and extent of our military commitment to Japan after that date. There are a number of factors which may influence the future. Very important is the future status of the Ryukyu islands which include the huge United States base installations on Okinawa. Although the United States returned the northern Ryukyus as well as the Bonin islands to Japan, it has insisted on retention of control over Okinawa for military purposes directly connected with the war in Vietnam. The United States has recognized the "residual sovereignty" of Japan over Okinawa so the future of this Japanese territory is a matter of negotiation, and no doubt every effort will be made to reach agreement in connection with the problem of renewal or otherwise of the American-Japanese security treaty. Other major factors concerning future United States military commitments to Japan include internal political opposition to the "American-Japanese alliance" and the whole question of protection of Japan from possible nuclear attack. Present United States military commitments to Japan are clear, but the future after this year is cloudy, indeed.

#### **THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

At the very beginning of the Korean War President Harry S. Truman announced, on

June 27, 1950, that the United States would regard an attack on Formosa (Taiwan) as a threat to United States security and that he was ordering the Seventh Fleet to interpose itself between Formosa and the mainland to counter any possible attack by Chinese Communist forces. This was, therefore, a unilateral military commitment to defend the Republic of China and its territory of Taiwan against external attack, and it remained such until after SEATO was organized in September, 1954.

On December 2, 1954, the United States regularized its commitments to the Republic of China on Taiwan in a mutual defense treaty. Negotiations on this treaty were begun after the Korean armistice and had lagged until SEATO came into existence. In Article II of this treaty, the obligation to maintain and develop the capacity to resist armed attack is similar to that in the Korean treaty, but there is an additional clause expressing the signatories' determination to build up their capacity to resist "Communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability." Article III is similar to provisions in the SEATO treaty concerning the strengthening of free institutions and promotion of economic progress and social well-being. Article IV provides for consultation of the two parties "from time to time regarding the implementation of this treaty." Article V, like provisions of some previous treaties, stipulates that an armed attack on the territories of one party would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the other but refers specifically to an armed attack "in the Pacific area." (The Korean treaty does not define any area, while the Philippine and ANZUS treaties, discussed later, use the phrase "in the Pacific," and include armed attacks on the "armed forces, public vessels and aircraft" of the parties. This latter clause is omitted from the treaty.)

Article VI defines the territories to which the treaty applies as "Taiwan and the Pescadores" but stipulates that it may be applicable to "other territories" when "determined by mutual agreement." Article VII is similar

to the Korean and first Japanese treaties in granting the United States "the right to dispose such land, sea and air forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense as determined by mutual agreement." The offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, held by the Chinese Nationalist government, are not mentioned specifically, but there is little doubt that if these islands did come under massive Chinese Communist attack, the treaty would provide a basis for assistance by the United States, if it were necessary and desirable.

There is little doubt that the United States is committed to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores by military means if this territory comes under armed attack, but as in the Korean treaty the United States is *not* obligated by treaty to support a Nationalist Chinese attack against any part of Communist China.

### THE PHILIPPINES

Prior to the signing of the treaty of peace with Japan, the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. This treaty obligates the two parties first, to develop their capacity to resist armed attack; second, to *consult* if their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened in the Pacific; and, third, to *take appropriate action* if either party is the object of an "armed attack" in the Pacific area. Article V provides that the "armed attack" referred to shall include not only an attack on the metropolitan territories of either the Philippines or the United States but also one on "island territories under [their] jurisdiction in the Pacific or on [their] armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."

There is no provision for the stationing of United States armed forces, land, sea or air, "in or about the Philippines," as in the Korean treaty. The maintenance of United States bases of various kinds in the Philippines is the subject of separate agreements—bases have been considered negotiable as to their future status by both the United States and the Philippine governments. There is little question that in any kind of a massive armed

attack on Philippine territory the United States is committed to assist the Philippines militarily, *provided* there is mutual agreement. The United States military commitment to defend the Philippines, therefore, is not automatic, but subject to joint consultation in view of the time and circumstances under which such an attack might occur.

### AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

On September 1, 1951, the United States signed a tripartite mutual defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand. The same obligations as noted above in the Philippine Treaty are included in this treaty which became known as the ANZUS Pact. There is one important addition in Article VII that provides for the establishment of a tripartite Council, consisting of the foreign ministers or their deputies from each country to meet at least annually for consideration of any problems related to their treaty obligations. Meetings of military representatives of the three states are also provided for. The ANZUS Council was authorized in both the preamble and in Article VIII to maintain "consultative" relationships with states and regional organizations in the Pacific area, "pending development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific," thus foreshadowing the establishment of SEATO.

By the terms of this treaty, Australia and New Zealand qualify as allies of the United States, and the ANZUS pact has appeared more than once to be the only real working alliance in which the United States is a partner and in which the three partners share, much more than in the case of other Asian states, a common political heritage and common political interests in the Asian-Pacific area. Military commitments of each of the ANZUS partners are unspecified and are not automatic, but subject to consultation and agreed upon action.

### SEATO

There are four states in continental southeast Asia toward which the United States has had varying kinds of military commitments:



South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. All are embraced within the broad umbrella of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization established at Manila on September 8, 1954. Since much, if not most of United States action in the Vietnam war has been justified as a fulfillment of SEATO commitments, we start from this treaty and then examine commitments to these four countries.

Contrary to some commentators, SEATO was never intended to be a counterpart of the more tightly constructed NATO alliance system. The SEATO treaty is similar in part to mutual defense agreements like the ANZUS pact, but departs from them in several important respects. First, as in previous treaties, the parties undertake individually and jointly, by means of continuous self-help and mutual aid, "to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article I). This obligation also extends to preventing and countering "subversive activities directed from without against the territorial integrity and political stability" of the signatories.<sup>2</sup>

Second, in Article III, the parties to the treaty pledge themselves to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate in further economic measures, including technical assistance, designed to promote economic progress and social well-being.

Third, as in previous treaties referred to, each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in "the treaty area" would endanger its own peace and safety and they all agree to consult, if in the opinion of any one party, there is such a threat or a situation that might endanger the peace of the area (Article IV). Most importantly, consultation may be required if an armed attack

occurs on the territory of any party to the treaty or on any state or territory "which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate." This article also stipulates that action taken to repel armed attack under the above conditions can only be taken *at the invitation or with the consent* of the government concerned.

Fourth, the "treaty area" is defined in Article VIII as "the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian states parties to the agreement and the general area of the Southwest Pacific but not including the area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude." To ensure that the protection of the SEATO agreement would apply to the Indochina states, a protocol to the treaty was agreed to by all signatories designating the states of Cambodia and Laos and the "free" territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam as territories included within the "treaty area" for the purposes of the provisions of Articles III and IV.<sup>3</sup>

Fifth and finally, there is one very significant departure from previous United States defense treaties. At the Manila Conference of 1954, United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was most anxious that the United States should not be obligated to act in purely intra-regional conflicts such as later developed between Indonesia and Malaysia and between India and Pakistan. Consequently, the United States issued an "understanding" prior to signing the treaty and the protocol which stated that aggression and armed attack would apply only to "Communist" aggression, but that it would consult with other treaty members in cases of "other aggression or armed attack." Like the ANZUS pact, the SEATO treaty established a Council that meets at least annually, and joint military planning and military maneuvers are provided for.

Three of the Asian states are members of SEATO—the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan—and United States military commitments to each are different. The United States has a dual commitment to the Philippines under the mutual defense treaty and

<sup>2</sup> The signatories of SEATO were: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. France and Pakistan have been inactive in the past few years. For excerpts, see p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> The status of Malaysia and Singapore is discussed later. In 1954 the "treaty area" included Malaya and the British Borneo territories. With the independence of Malaysia and Singapore, these were excluded since the new government did not join SEATO, preferring to rely on Commonwealth defense. Laos was removed from the "treaty area" because of provisions for her neutrality agreed to at the Geneva Conference of 1962.

SEATO. The same is true for Thailand, but on March 6, 1962, due to the situation in Laos, United States troops and air force units were sent to northeast Thailand and a joint statement was issued by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman declaring that the United States recognized its obligation under the SEATO treaty to help Thailand in the event of "Communist armed attack" and that this obligation was individual as well as collective. Secretary Rusk affirmed that this unilateral commitment was not dependent upon prior agreement with other SEATO members. Cambodia is included in the "treaty area" of SEATO, and as this is written, negotiations are under way for a resumption of United States-Cambodia relations severed in 1965. Reportedly President Nixon will allow the United States to recognize the territorial integrity of Cambodia's "existing boundaries." The United States has no precise military commitment to Cambodia. The United States has no mutual defense treaty with Pakistan although it has supplied large amounts of arms and military equipment to Pakistan since 1954. Because of the United States stoppage of arms aid at the time of the Indo-Pakistan summer war of 1965, Pakistan is a virtually "non-participating" member of SEATO. At present the United States has no military commitments whatever to Pakistan.

With India the United States has no

mutual defense treaty, but it did supply arms aid after the 1962 border war with Communist China. Although the Indian government may expect that if Communist China threatened massive land invasion or possible nuclear attack on India, the United States would respond to a call for help, it cannot be sure.

#### **PRESENT U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS: A SUMMARY**

The foregoing summary of possible present and future United States military commitments under existing treaties reveals that present and future United States military commitments in Asia are a matter of foreign policy and not a question of "legal" obligations. In no treaty to which the United States is a party is there an "automatic" obligation to respond to "an attack" by immediate use of military forces. Therefore, present and future United States military commitment to any Asian country or territory is a question of policy, not of any fixed or "automatic" legal obligation. Having said this, let us add up the score. In all of Asia from East Asia around to the borders of Afghanistan there are 21 states.<sup>4</sup> By treaty, or in accordance with a U.N. obligation or by policy declaration, the United States is at least *morally* committed to give military assistance to only 9 of these states.<sup>5</sup> In the cases of Japan, of South Vietnam and of Cambodia, the nature and extent of future United States military commitments are in doubt, pending the outcome of negotiations on the United States-Japanese security treaty and the possible settlement of the war in Vietnam.

To be sure, the above statement needs qualification. If, for example, the Chinese Communists should launch a massive armed attack against India, the American government might very well respond with military assistance to a call for help as it did in 1962. Aid might also be offered in case of a Chinese attack on Pakistan. If Laos were threatened by a large-scale attempt of the Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese support to take over that little country, it is possible that the United States would respond by a

<sup>4</sup> These are: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Communist China, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. In addition to these 21 states, there are still colonial enclaves: Hong Kong and adjoining territories, the British protected state of Brunei and Portuguese Timor. To be comprehensive, this list would also have to include the many island territories in the Pacific under varying administrations such as the British, French, Australian and New Zealand administered territories, as well as the United States Trust Territories in the western Pacific. Also, the Peoples Republic of Outer Mongolia should probably be added.

<sup>5</sup> These nine states are: Cambodia (a protocol state under SEATO), Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand (covered by the ANZUS pact) and South Vietnam. In a sense, these are "client states" and the United States is their "patron."

commitment of military forces. The same thing goes for other territories in Asia and the Pacific but these are decidedly "iffy" questions, dependent wholly on United States policy decisions at the time.

In determining present and possible future United States military commitments in Asia and the Pacific area a number of factors must be taken into consideration. First, no one can predict at this writing the outcome of the Vietnam war and the possible political settlement that may result. Therefore, no one can predict just what military commitments the American government may be willing to assume in the aftermath of Vietnam. Second, no one can safely predict the outcome of United States-Japanese negotiations on the security treaty on Okinawa and the American bases in Japan between now and January, 1970. No one can say whether the United States military commitment to Japan will be less or greater after that date. Third, it is important to recognize that the Vietnam war has caused a very considerable advance in military technology. During one week in 1969, the United States airlifted a sizeable force of combat-ready troops from North Carolina to South Korea in 31 hours. This illustration of a large-scale air-sea lift capacity does not change the nature and scope of United States military commitments, but it does point up a possible change in the need for United States bases around the rim of Asia. It shifts the demand of the United States military for bases with ground and air forces in Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Vietnam and Thailand to a lesser need simply for "base usage" in case of trouble. Fourth, the foregoing factor is also emphasized in the problem of protecting the security of Malaysia and Singapore, not United States responsibilities. With the British decision to phase out of Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, both Australia and New Zealand have agreed to assume some of the defense responsibilities of the British for protection of these two Commonwealth members.

But Britain has also announced that she will still honor her military commitment for

defense of these states by staging a joint military exercise late in 1969 or early in 1970 in which British combat-ready forces with equipment will be airlifted to the Malaysia-Singapore area as a demonstration of what could be done in case of a call for help. Fifth, in view of the above factor, it should again be emphasized that United States military commitments in the Asian-Pacific area are not completely unilateral. We are not alone. We do have allies, as the participation of South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand in the Vietnam war have demonstrated. Future United States military commitments will undoubtedly take into account this factor. Sixth, and finally, present United States military commitments in Asia and the Pacific are the result of United States policy determinations and decisions taken to implement our Asian policy by military and other means. The various mutual defense treaties and the SEATO treaty are only the expression of United States policy in agreements with certain other countries. To be sure, all of the treaties referred to in this analysis have been approved by the United States Senate, and the executive branch of the United States

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William C. Johnstone taught political science at the George Washington University until 1946. There he also served as dean of the School of Government. He was director of U.S.I.S. for India during 1946-1947 and an adviser to the U.S. diplomatic mission to Nepal in 1947. He served in the Department of State until 1953. During 1957-1959, he was co-director of the Rangoon-Hopkins Center of Southeast Asian Studies and visiting professor at the University of Rangoon. He has lectured and traveled extensively in South and Southeast Asia, most recently in 1962. Mr. Johnstone is a lecturer at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute and a consultant to the RAND Corporation. Author of a number of works on Asian politics, his most recent publication is *Burma's Foreign Policy—A Study in Neutrality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

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*Discussing the future of collective defense agreements in Asia, this author predicts that "Japan, Australia and the United States might agree to provide the necessary backup of sophisticated weapons, training assistance and financing—but not manpower—in a new Southeast Asia defensive agreement."*

## U.S. Defense in the Nuclear Age

BY BERNARD K. GORDON

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IN THE WAKE OF the war in Vietnam, each proposition of the American involvement in Asian security—ranging from the most fundamental and enduring to the most tactical and immediate—is being questioned. SEATO (a multi-national and geographically widespread organization) as well as most United States bilateral military commitments in Asia are the subjects of searching reappraisal among policymakers and the general public. For many, the root question is whether the United States has a vital national interest in helping to provide for Asian security; for many others the more important question is whether multilateral organizations—like SEATO and ANZUS—are an effective way of achieving that objective. In this article it will be assumed that the United States does have a continuing and vital interest in contributing to the security of East Asia.<sup>1</sup>

But if that interest has characterized the United States relationship to East Asia since 1900 (when the Open Door policy took shape), the circumstances affecting that interest have many times changed. In the earliest years of this century (prior to World

War I) it was reasonable for American statesmen to place their reliance on a multilateral framework. World War I, however, saw the departure of the European powers from Asia. As a result, the United States expectation that other large powers shared its interest in avoiding one-nation dominance in Asia was no longer well-founded. This reality was not grasped at the time. In the 1920's and 1930's, American leaders often behaved as if Britain and France, for example, were still significant actors on the Asian scene, and shared Washington's interest in preventing single-nation Asian hegemony. That was hardly true, for a fundamental consequence of World War I was that only Japan and the United States were Asian heavyweights.

Despite that basic change, United States Presidents and secretaries of state still tried to rely on a multilateral framework in their search for stability and security in Asia. Symbolic of this effort were the Washington and London naval limitations conferences of the 1920's. Indeed, even in the early 1930's, when Japan had begun her policy of expansion in earnest, the United States still sought to persuade others to join multi-national efforts designed to dissuade Japan from further aggrandizement and aggression. All of these efforts failed, and in the end the United States was forced to rely on its own efforts to achieve the wartime defeat of the Japanese.

The myth of multilateralism died hard, however; even in 1943–1944 President Frank-

\* The views expressed here are those of the author alone and are not to be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Research Analysis Corporation or any of its sponsors.

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter II in my book *Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969).

lin Roosevelt found it important to provide the "color" of multilateralism to the United States single-handed control of the Pacific war effort. He endorsed the creation of a "Pacific War Council" which included representatives of Great Britain, Holland, Australia, New Zealand and others who ostensibly were involved in joint operations against the Japanese. The United States, in its Asian policies as elsewhere, seems always to prefer joint action (even the appearance of joint action) whenever possible. Thus, a half dozen years later when the United States responded to aggression in Korea, and President Harry Truman decided that the use of American arms was unavoidable, he simultaneously sought multilateral endorsement for his decision. In that case he turned with success to the United Nations and the useful fiction of a U.N. command. But there can be little doubt that the President and his advisers would have proceeded in the defense of Korea anyway; only the fortuitous absence of a boycotting Soviet member of the Security Council avoided a veto.

The point to stress is not that United Nations endorsement was irrelevant; it was not. U.N. endorsement did help to attract the support of many nations, even outside of Asia, for the Korean effort. In retrospect, the contrast between the widespread support given to the Korean action—as compared with the very narrow international support on which the United States can count today in its Vietnam efforts—is striking. One conclusion from that contrast is already clear: the wider the extent of support in the international community for an American-led military intervention, the smaller are United States problems at home in maintaining domestic support and understanding for that military action. Yet even taking that "lesson" into account, we ought not forget the main point about President Truman's Korean decision in 1950: while the United States sought and achieved wide international endorsement for its Korean effort, that endorsement does not appear to have been vital to the decision.

The lessons of Korea were not lost on State Department adviser John Foster Dulles. Dulles was entrusted by the Truman administration with some of the tasks involved in negotiating not only peace treaty arrangements still remaining from World War II, but also new security arrangements which looked to the future. As early as 1949, for example, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines had begun to solicit United States guarantees relating to their security, and the outbreak of the Korean War only quickened the pace of those developments. By 1951, a bilateral defense agreement was made with the Philippines, and the first of the Asian multilateral structures, the three-way treaty with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), was completed in the same year. Dulles was the key figure in both agreements, and they are the most enduring and perhaps least questioned of all our Asian defense commitments. To this day Australia and New Zealand place their heaviest reliance on the United States commitment as it is reflected in that ANZUS pact, just as Manila places its primary security trust in Washington as reflected in the bilateral Philippines-American treaty. Both were negotiated by Dulles long before he took over as Secretary of State, and it is ironic that SEATO—now the subject of such widespread doubts—is the defense treaty most commonly associated with his name.

The United States purpose in creating SEATO was to stake a claim, as it were, to the defense and security of the region and to put others on notice that the United States would not abdicate from providing the major military force necessary to prevent Communist dominance in Southeast Asia. It was decidedly not Dulles' purpose to rigidify Southeast Asian nations into an orthodox collective security arrangement to which they could not usefully contribute. It was for this reason, for example, that Dulles resisted calling the Manila Pact by the name that has since been given to it. "He made an effort to have it nicknamed MANPAC, for Manila Pact, by way of emphasizing that it differed from NATO, but SEATO stuck."<sup>2</sup>

Despite the SEATO label, however, the

<sup>2</sup> John R. Beal, *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).



differences between it and NATO need to be remembered. The circumstances of the European environment and the purposes envisaged for NATO both called for and allowed for the permanent stationing of sizeable United States *and* allied military forces. That was an appropriate response in that environment because for some years a conventional Soviet military move was seen as one of the more likely threats to European security. In East Asia, on the other hand, a similar conventional military threat was not among the likely threats at the time SEATO was formed, nor was a permanent and collective military deployment an appropriate response. The most that seemed feasible and necessary was almost precisely what Dulles set out to do: to convey the message that the United States remained committed to the security of the region, and to do this in a way that would help bolster the confidence of small Asian nations.

Compared to NATO, these were limited purposes, and because of these limited goals the United States never tried to bolster SEATO with the kind of infrastructure and joint military forces that characterized its European alliance—and Washington's posture

toward that alliance. It seems clear from the evidence (or rather the *lack* of any evidence that the United States pressed for significantly intensified efforts in SEATO) that the Manila Pact was not expected nor intended to become a conventional alliance system. The United States expected instead that should a high-level threat develop (from China, no doubt), the major defense and deterrent role in Asia and the Pacific would continue to be a function of United States air and naval forces.

At the low end of the threat spectrum, i.e., in terms of subversion and insurgency, the United States hoped that its essentially bilateral military assistance programs would enable each potentially threatened state to manage on its own resources. Certainly few if any efforts were made to develop joint programs for collective defense on the ground, and in the few cases where outside troop assistance was implemented—as in Thailand and Vietnam—the United States deployed ground units on the basis of bilateral agreements.<sup>3</sup> The SEATO framework was almost incidental to those decisions, although within the United States domestic context it may have been useful to point to the treaty as an added justification for these actions.

### SEATO IN THE FUTURE

In sum, SEATO did not represent an American effort to duplicate patterns that had been applied to Europe, and in all important respects it has simply not been comparable to NATO.<sup>4</sup> SEATO is instead better understood as an effort in image-building, and at most as an annex to and a restatement of the many bilateral arrangements that the United States has concluded in East Asia. In that context SEATO may have played an important and general deterrent role since 1954—not because it was a formidable collective defense agreement, but because it symbolized a high-level United States military commitment in Southeast Asia. Any deterrent effect during the years of SEATO's existence must be traced to a Chinese (and perhaps Soviet) perception of United States will, in which SEATO *per se* can have had only marginal meaning.

<sup>3</sup> Even in the heyday of Secretary Dulles' alleged propensity for collecting allies and building "pacts" (some have referred to this as his "pactomania"), the United States did not seek to enlarge the formal membership of SEATO. Cambodia, for example, is reported in the immediate and depressing aftermath of the 1954 Geneva settlements to have sought more specific defense guarantees from the United States. Prince (then King) Sihanouk, according to some sources, even expressed his willingness to join a "Western security system for Southeast Asia" if an American guarantee went with it (Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia* [Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955], p. 189). Michael Leifer similarly reports that "Cambodia was the most anxious of the Indochinese states to be militarily associated with the United States" (Michael Leifer, *Cambodia and Neutrality* [Canberra: Australian National University, 1962], p. 23). Thus, despite Cambodia's interest at that time, the United States was singularly unresponsive to efforts to extend its guarantees on the mainland beyond Thailand, and certainly was not seeking to enlarge the formal coverage of SEATO.

<sup>4</sup> In terms of its geographic scope alone SEATO cannot usefully be compared with NATO—for an Asian security framework that does not include Japan, Taiwan and Korea hardly expresses the full range of U.S. defense interests and guarantees in East Asia.

Deterrence against major conventional and certainly against nuclear aggression in Asia will continue to be largely an American function. This condition may well remain essentially unchanged for the foreseeable future. That reality is increasingly understood in East Asia, and this implicit American defense umbrella—instead of detracting from indigenous interest in regional cooperation—appears to enhance recent trends in Asia toward defense cooperation. This should be a welcome development for United States foreign policy, especially in the light of the United States objective of encouraging more self-reliance and eventually achieving “multi-polarity” in East Asia.

It needs to be stressed, however, that the type and style of any emergent patterns of Asian security cooperation are likely to be unique, or at least different from collective defense efforts that have been tried elsewhere. This reflects the widespread negativism found throughout Asia towards the concept of defense “pacts,” as well as certain security conditions specific to Southeast Asia—the Asian sub-region where interest in defense cooperation is strongest. Both factors suggest the lines along which military cooperation is most likely to develop.

First, SEATO will provide no model for foreseeable Asian defense efforts, because SEATO was essentially a unilateral American guarantee with merely the color of multilateralism. Leaders in contemporary Southeast Asia reject that model; they seek instead to disassociate themselves as much as possible from too heavy dependence on the United States or any other great power.

Second, it can be safely presumed that future defense arrangements will in all likelihood grow out of presently discernible patterns of Southeast Asian regionalism. Asian leaders are extremely unlikely to embark on an ad hoc collective defense arrangement, or create a new organization specifically for defense purposes. Instead, there is increasing evidence that today’s leaders realize that defense cooperation is the most difficult form

of international collaboration, and they recognize as a result that much common experience and trust are required before this more difficult form of cooperation can be attempted.

This is, of course, precisely the opposite of the process that developed in SEATO, CENTO or NATO. Each of those bodies, and SEATO in particular, has striven to find new “non-military” tasks and functions to perform, as if by so doing it could polish a tarnished image. But that is a difficult if not impossible transformation to achieve, and leaders in Southeast Asia today appear to recognize that defense cooperation will be more soundly based if it grows from other forms of collaborative experience. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman has said as much in his recent calls for devoting much more intensive levels of effort in ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Mutual interests developed through “economic cooperation and . . . joint projects,” he has begun to emphasize, will provide the ASEAN nations “with something they want to join together to defend.”<sup>5</sup>

Finally, it is reasonable to predict that the most likely Asian regional security arrangements (because they will center on Southeast Asia) will be primarily concerned with defense against low-level or insurgent threats. No responsible leader in Southeast Asia deceives himself into believing that the full range of defense functions can be met by the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Reluctantly perhaps, but at the same time realistically, most recognize that the ultimate element of security (for example against “nuclear blackmail” or large-scale aggression) can be provided only by the United States, and this is the *sine qua non* for their own efforts. Indeed, if they are to become increasingly willing to shoulder a greater share of local defense burdens, these leaders must at the same time be assured that the overall strategic umbrella will be provided by the United States.

These characteristics suggest an ambivalence about the United States security role in Asia that must be regarded as one of the region’s most important political features. There is on the one hand a strong desire to

<sup>5</sup> *Bangkok Post*, March 8, 1968.

loosen dependence on the United States, but this is tempered by the belief of many that Washington should continue to play some sort of protective role. In Southeast Asia especially, much of the contemporary interest in regional cooperation grows from a strong concern to reduce dependence on the West, and on the United States in particular. This conviction is strongest in Thailand and is only slightly less strong in Indonesia. Even among those nations which do not yet give priority to regionalism (like Burma and Cambodia), there is nonetheless agreement on the need to reduce dependence on the West.

### BILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM IN THE 1970'S

These sentiments make it clear that in any future defense arrangement no outside great power, and probably not even a middle-range power like Australia, is likely to be acceptable as a formal participant. The reason, of course, is the widespread conviction that great power participation is too reminiscent of the SEATO model.

In these circumstances it is likely that entirely new and creative approaches will be called for. Because of the considerable disaffection regarding SEATO among most Asian leaders, an effort designed to revise that organization will be disappointing. The Thai government, for example, places very little reliance on the Manila pact—an attitude bolstered by the fact that neither France nor Pakistan have played any significant role in the alliance in recent years.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Britain's announced intention to withdraw her military forces from Asia after 1971 must have further reinforced Asian doubts about the long-term viability of SEATO. Further, the fact that such states as Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan are not involved in SEATO

should by now be sufficient evidence that the useful initiative of Secretary Dulles in 1954 is not applicable to the needs of the 1970's.

Does this mean that the United States should scrap all thoughts of a multilateral approach to Asian security? Probably not, if for no other reason than that Americans—especially after Vietnam—will be increasingly unwilling to take on new bilateral commitments. In between those extremes, however, lies a probable and practical middle ground for a new American approach to Asia. In this middle ground lies an opportunity for a constructive American approach, designed to respond to the most likely forms of aggression and to Americans' historic preference for multilateral burden-sharing in Asia. The United States will still have to perform the major deterrent function in the overall strategic balance in Asia—but, just as in 1954, a general or nuclear war is perhaps the least likely of Asia's security problems. For the decade of the 1970's at least, the main concern of defense in Asia will be how to combat insurgency and subversion in such countries as Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines and Indonesia. What they lack are the essential ingredients of equipment, training, experience and financing.

Three of the world's most advanced and prosperous countries do possess those essential ingredients and, more important, their Asian-Pacific location leads them to regard stability in Southeast Asia as among their most vital

(Continued on page 117)

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<sup>6</sup> The important "Rusk-Thanat Agreement" of 1962, by which the United States agreed to a bilateral commitment to the defense and security of Thailand, derives largely from this disaffection. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand sought and successfully drew from the United States an understanding that even in the absence of unanimity in SEATO (which Thanat feared might not always be achieved), the U.S. would nevertheless regard the security of Thailand as a vital American interest.

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*"The power of Congress to declare war . . . is at the heart of the conflict between those who feel that the Chief Executive should be permitted to exercise almost untrammelled judgment in making military commitments, and those who believe that presidential discretion in this matter has grown to excessive proportions."*

# Congress and Military Commitments: An Overview

BY ALLAN S. NANES

*Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress*

THE LATE Edward S. Corwin, in his classic study, *The President—Office and Powers*, observed that "the Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers which are capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."<sup>1</sup> The truth of this observation has been confirmed many times in American history, particularly when the executive and legislative branches have disagreed on important aspects of that policy. In the past few years the entire question has been reopened by the bitter controversy touched off by the war in Vietnam. The hawks have tended to defend the power of the President and his advisers to set the course of our foreign policy, while the doves, in and out of Congress, have tended to assert that presidential leadership of foreign policy has been permitted to develop beyond wise and even beyond constitutional bounds. In consequence, they have called for an enlarged role for Congress in the making of foreign policy, particularly with respect to military commitments abroad. Such a development would restore the balance between the legislative and the executive branches in the conduct of

foreign affairs, a restoration that, in this view, is long overdue.

In entering into overseas military commitments, the President relies upon the following constitutional provisions: Article II, Section 1, Clause 1; Article II, Section 2, Clauses 1 and 2. These provide that the executive power shall be vested in the President; that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States; and that he shall have the power to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur. Although these powers are few in number, they provide sufficient authority for the President to enter into whatever military commitments he deems are in the national interest, provided that in the case of formalized treaties, he can carry a sufficient number of senators with him.

While at first glance the vesting of executive power in the President may seem to have little bearing on United States military commitments, it is by virtue of this power that he determines which matters will be the subject of negotiation, when, with what objectives, and so forth. While the President *makes* treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, *he alone negotiates* them, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the case of the

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<sup>1</sup> Edward S. Corwin, *The President—Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1948), 3rd edition, p. 208.

*United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation*.<sup>2</sup> It is by virtue of this executive power that the President can actually direct our foreign relations, although his broad general power is reinforced by a number of specific grants of authority. The President is also responsible for the enforcement of treaty obligations. Constitutional powers aside, the President is the national leader, and therefore in a better position to influence public opinion on the question of military commitments should he choose to do so, than any individual or committee in Congress.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has been able to order our forces to stations overseas, in accordance with prior commitments, or to meet threatening crises. Under present interpretations of this power, the President can negotiate an executive agreement with a foreign country, permitting the stationing of United States troops on its soil, without having to submit the agreement to the Senate. It is also widely held that he may act in similar fashion under his general grant of executive power. Under the pressures of the war in Vietnam these views, which have never enjoyed unquestioned acceptance, face renewed and broadened challenge.

Despite the fact that foreign military commitments are made by the executive branch, Congress has formidable constitutional powers bearing directly on this subject. By the terms of Article II, Section 2, the Senate must approve treaties; thus any formal agreements involving military commitments must pass senatorial review. Congress also has the power, under Article I, Section 8, to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises in order to pay debts and provide for the general welfare and the common defense. It may also borrow money. Thus if Congress does not raise the funds, through taxes or borrowings, to support the requisite forces, a military commitment may be modified or nullified. Congress raises and supports armies, it provides and maintains navies, although no appropriation for the army shall be for more

than two years. In actual practice, this means that every year Congress reviews defense spending, which means it reviews defense policies and the military commitments those policies might involve. It can refuse to provide the funds necessary to implement a commitment it does not approve. Congress is also empowered to make rules for governing our land and naval (and by extension our air) forces. It may provide for calling forth the militia (the National Guard) to repel invasions, and it provides for the arming, organizing, and disciplining of this militia. All these powers relate to the strength of our military establishment, and hence have some impact on the extent of our overseas defense commitments. Congress also has the power to declare war, of which more below. Finally, Congress may make all laws "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated powers, and any other powers vested in the United States government or any department or officer thereof. Based on this "necessary and proper" clause, Chief Justice John Marshall elaborated the doctrine of implied powers, which has been one of the main props underlying the expansion of congressional power. Although primarily important for its domestic effect, this broad interpretation of congressional prerogative could conceivably be significant if applied in connection with foreign affairs.

## DECLARATION OF WAR

The power of Congress to declare war merits special attention, for it is at the heart of the conflict between those who feel that the Chief Executive should be permitted to exercise almost untrammelled judgment in making military commitments, and those who believe that presidential discretion in this matter has grown to excessive proportions. There is widespread agreement that in this age of nuclear missiles, when ICBM's can travel at 15,000 miles an hour, a situation might arise in which the President might have to order a retaliatory attack without waiting for a formal declaration of war. But there is very grave concern that Congress' power to declare war, which is theoretically applicable

<sup>2</sup> 299 U.S. 304 (319), citing the Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, *Annals of Congress*, Vol. X, pp. 256-259.



in what used to be called "brush-fire wars," is in danger of being eroded away. For as matters now stand, the decision to invoke the congressional power to declare war is largely up to the President.

The struggle in Vietnam has illustrated this point in a particularly apposite way. What began there as a limited program of military advice and training gradually escalated, until the United States put more than 500 thousand troops into the country and became actively engaged in one of the most bitter wars in the nation's history. As the war grew in intensity, and optimistic predictions concerning its quick end proved false, opposition at home mounted to a crescendo. One argument repeatedly cited by opponents of the war was that it had never been declared by Congress, and was therefore being fought without legal sanction.<sup>3</sup>

The administration of Lyndon Johnson responded to this accusation by citing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964. That resolution was adopted at the behest of the White House, following two reported attacks on United States warships in the Tonkin Gulf, in August, 1964.<sup>4</sup> The vote was 88 to 2 in the Senate, and 414 to 0 in the House.

The resolution was framed in language which appeared to reinforce the President's authority in whatever course he chose to pursue. It stated that "Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It affirmed that the United States was prepared, "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of freedom." The resolution was to expire when the President deter-

mined that peace and security had been restored to the area, or by concurrent resolution of Congress (which does not require the President's signature).

### CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

In soliciting congressional support for actions he might take in Vietnam, President Johnson was following the practice specially favored by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and employed to a lesser degree by other post-war administrations. In 1955, at the time of the crisis over Matsu and Quemoy, President Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress, asking for authority to protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions against armed attack. In thus seeking congressional support, President Eisenhower stated that Congress should make clear the unified and serious intentions of the United States, and its readiness to fight if necessary. The resolution did not specify whether the United States would defend Quemoy or Matsu, nor did it spell out in specific terms just what area might be essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Despite this omission, and despite the specter of a war with Communist China, the resolution passed by a vote of 410 to 3 in the House, and 85 to 3 in the Senate.

In 1957, in the wake of the Suez crisis, President Eisenhower requested Congress to authorize a program of economic and military assistance to those nations of the Middle East which desired them, and to authorize the use of United States armed forces to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Middle East nations requesting aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism. A resolution embodying these provisions—and further stating that the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East were vital to United States national interests and world peace—was duly passed. It was invoked when the 6th Fleet was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean later in 1957, when Jordan was threatened with attack from Syria, which had a communist-oriented government at the time. It

<sup>3</sup> Those who contended that the war was illegal usually cast their arguments in terms of international, as well as United States constitutional, law.

<sup>4</sup> In the move to rescind the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1967, charges were made that these attack reports had been fabricated. For excerpts from the resolution, see p. 113.

was cited again when the President ordered Marines to Lebanon in July, 1958.

It is worth noting that President Johnson, when he was signing the Tonkin Gulf resolution, referred to the fact that he had ordered retaliatory air strikes for the attacks on our destroyers and stated that "As Commander-in-Chief the responsibility was mine—and mine alone." As for the resolution, he declared that it confirmed and reinforced the powers of the Presidency.<sup>5</sup>

President Eisenhower, despite his more conservative view of the powers of his office, pointed out in his special message concerning the Formosa resolution that "authority for some of the actions which might be required" was inherent in his power as Commander-in-Chief. Speaker Sam Rayburn advanced the view that the resolution added nothing to the powers of the President and consequently should not be taken as a precedent.

In September, 1962, before the full dimensions of the Cuban missile crisis became known, President John F. Kennedy stated that if the Communist arms buildup were to interfere with United States security in any way, this country would do whatever might be necessary to protect its security and that of its allies. He further stated that a congressional resolution was not necessary to his authority. However Congress proceeded to adopt a resolution which expressed United States determination to prevent Cuba from extending her aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the Hemisphere, and also to prevent the creation of an externally supported military capability in Cuba capable of endangering United States security. Thus when the President made his radio and television report to the American people on the arms buildup in Cuba, on October 22, 1962, he mentioned "the authority entrusted to me

by the Constitution, as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress."<sup>6</sup>

Thus three successive Presidents noted their authority to take certain contemplated military action independent of congressional approval, although President Eisenhower apparently felt somewhat less secure in this assumption than his successors. There is ample historical precedent for the argument that the executive could act independently. According to John Swarthout and Ernest Bartley, "The President is empowered as commander-in-chief to send troops, ships and aircraft where and when he will in support of the foreign policy he is pursuing. If he wishes, he can order the armed forces to enter the territory of another country by force, and American Presidents have done so far more often than the average citizen realizes."<sup>7</sup>

United States forces have fought many undeclared wars, beginning with the so-called undeclared naval war with France in the earliest days of the Republic. Without a declaration of war, United States forces have also fought Barbary pirates, Chinese insurgents, Latin American troops, and Chinese and North Korean Communists. President William McKinley sent 5,000 men to China to help suppress the Boxer Rebellion. President Woodrow Wilson ordered the Marines to land at Vera Cruz, and a sharp engagement with Mexican cadets followed. President Calvin Coolidge sent troops to Nicaragua to put down the "bandit," Sandino. President Harry Truman ordered United States forces into combat in Korea, in the United Nations police action that was a war in everything but name.

It therefore seems apparent that, from the executive standpoint at any rate, the purpose of these resolutions was political harmony, not constitutional necessity. At least Presidents Kennedy and Johnson clearly believed that they possessed a constitutional warrant for the course of action they proposed to pursue. Therefore they saw no need to seek congressional approval. However, congressional endorsement was clearly useful to both Presidents, expressing as it did the support of the legislature, and by implication that of the

<sup>5</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson*, Vol. II, 1963-1964 (Wash., D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 946-947.

<sup>6</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy*, 1962 (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 607.

<sup>7</sup> John M. Swarthout and Ernest R. Bartley, *Principles and Problems of American National Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 633.

public in the face of international crisis. For President Eisenhower, with his publicly stated belief in the equality of the branches, such support was not only useful, but probably constitutionally comforting as well.

As the conflict in Vietnam wore on, many who had voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution began to have second thoughts. Aware of its broad language, they nevertheless contended that the resolution was simply meant to demonstrate congressional sanction for such limited measures as the President might take in response to the attacks on the *Mad-dox* and the *C. Turner Joy*. In their opinion, it was not meant to cover the expansion of the war, nor its transformation into an essentially Asian-American conflict. They believed they had administration assurances that the United States role in the conflict would not be expanded, and were angry and chagrined at the turn of events.

#### EXECUTIVE—LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT

This anger and chagrin culminated in an important resolution designed to reassert the right of Congress to participate in what might be called the commitment-making process. The first version was Senate Resolution 151, introduced by Senator J. William Fulbright (Ark., D.) on July 31, 1967. After consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee, a new draft emerged as Senate Resolution 187, which Fulbright introduced on November 20, 1967. The first draft was the broader, declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that a United States commitment to a foreign power "necessarily and exclusively" resulted from affirmative action by the executive and legislative branches of the government, "by means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment." This wording was as broad in its own way as that of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, in that it did not differentiate between types of commitments, but apparently required congressional sanction for all of them.

Senate Resolution 187, in contrast, was confined to one type of commitment, the commitment of United States armed forces to

hostilities on foreign territory. The resolution declared it to be the sense of the Senate that such a commitment, for any purpose other than to repel an attack on this country, or to protect United States citizens or property, would result from a decision made according to constitutional processes, which were defined to mean appropriate executive action plus affirmative action by Congress "specifically intended to give rise to such a commitment." This resolution was apparently designed to reaffirm the role of Congress in declaring war.

When testimony was taken on S. Res. 151, the case against it was put most forcefully by the then Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach. He argued that there was no need to disturb the boundaries between legislative and executive which had served the nation well for almost 200 years in the conduct of foreign policy. The Under Secretary challenged the committee when he stated that a declaration of war was outmoded if applied to the limited objectives of the United States in Vietnam. What the Constitution required in such a context was that Congress be given an opportunity to express its views. Katzenbach contended that Congress had had such an opportunity. It had expressed its views relative to peace and security in Southeast Asia through the debates on the SEATO Treaty and with respect to the use of the military in that area through the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The combination of the two fulfilled the executive's obligation "to participate with the Congress" and to give it a "full and effective voice," and constituted the "functional equivalent" of a declaration of war. However Katzenbach said that he did not wish to be understood as saying that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was tantamount to a declaration of war, because that term implied broader objectives than the United States actually had in Vietnam.

In its report on S. Res. 187, the Foreign Relations Committee rejected the idea that the war powers, as spelled out in the Constitution, are obsolete. It rejected the idea that United States armed forces could be committed to conflict without the consent of Con-

gress, except in cases of sudden attack upon the United States, in which case the President's authority was unchallenged. It noted that the trend in the twentieth century had been toward the use of armed forces without the consent of Congress. That trend had progressed to the point where the real power to commit the country to war was now in the hands of the President. Although only Congress has the power to declare war, many believed that the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, had the authority to use the armed forces in any way he saw fit. The very exercise of presidential power over the armed forces has given rise to a belief in its constitutional legitimacy. This belief, too, the committee rejected.

The committee laid the blame for this transfer of the war power as much on Congress as on the executive. Congress had acquiesced in too many incursions on its power, and where it had not acquiesced it had not challenged. Congress had agreed to this diminution in its own power for several reasons, among which were the unfamiliarity of the United States with its new role as a world power, and the consequent lack of guidelines for adapting its constitutional system to this new situation, as well as pressure for emergency action.

In the committee's view this trend toward executive supremacy in foreign policy was a dangerous one, which it hoped to see arrested and reversed. The restoration of the constitutional balance was not only compatible with efficiency, but essential to democracy.

The committee recognized that formal declarations of war are not the only means by which Congress can authorize the President to initiate limited or general hostilities and held that the joint resolutions discussed above were a proper method of granting this authority. The committee was insistent, however, that these resolutions should actually *grant authority*, and not merely express approval of undefined action to be taken by the President. Recent resolutions, it declared,

simply enabled the President to claim support for any action he chose to take, and were so phrased "as to express Congressional acquiescence in the constitutionally unsound contention that the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to commit the country to war."<sup>8</sup>

Thus the committee set forth in unequivocal language its view that foreign military commitments, especially the ultimate commitment to war, were primarily the responsibility of Congress. Many people, in and out of government, vigorously dispute that view. Prior to the conflict in Vietnam, belief in the necessity of executive supremacy in conducting foreign policy and making military commitments was widely, and probably predominantly, held by the academic community. Presumably the situation in Vietnam changed many viewpoints but whether the majority changed its views is not yet clear.

Congress took no action on Senate Resolution 187 after it was reported out of committee. Throughout 1968, however, debate over the conflict in Vietnam was increasingly extended to cover the scope of United States commitments, and the methods of reaching them. Senator Fulbright reopened the issue in the Senate shortly after the 91st Congress convened, when he submitted Senate Resolution 85, whose language duplicated that of Senate Resolution 151 of the preceding Congress.

In reintroducing the broadly worded resolution, Senator Fulbright remarked that it was concerned particularly, but not exclusively, with the commitment of United States armed forces to hostilities abroad. He noted that it was also concerned "with the variety of arrangements—be they treaties, laws, executive agreements, or simple executive declarations—by which in current practice the United States commits itself to the defense, military support, or other forms of assistance to foreign nations."

The new resolution was reported out on March 12, 1969. According to the *Washington Post's* story the next day, the Senator said that the purpose of the resolution was to restore Congress' role in foreign affairs by

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *National Commitments*, Report No. 797, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1967), p. 26.



"helping to avoid serious mistakes of judgment" by the executive.<sup>9</sup> The State Department, however, consistent with its earlier position, opposed the new resolution. In a letter to the Foreign Relations Committee it questioned "the usefulness of attempting to fix by resolution precise rules codifying the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches." It affirmed the necessity of close legislative-executive cooperation in foreign affairs, and pledged to act on that basis.

The State Department's view is rooted in the belief that the effective conduct of foreign affairs requires the greatest possible flexibility for the executive. It fears that this flexibility would be seriously damaged if Congress asserted a right to a greater rôle in foreign policy making.<sup>10</sup> Supporters of executive supremacy also hold that if commitments made by the President need to be substantiated by a legislative instrumentality, foreign countries would not be sure that the President actually enunciates the foreign policy of the United States, and this would introduce an element of instability into international affairs. They maintain that with our security dependent on a complex structure of alliances, the country cannot afford to have every agreement under those arrangements subject to Congressional approval. They remind those who fear his abuse of authority that there are practical curbs on what the President may actually do.

Supporters of a broadened role for Congress remain sceptical of opposition arguments. They point to a recent report involving commitments purportedly made to Spain, not by the State Department, but by the Department of Defense. These commitments, made in the negotiations for the renewal of the lease on four United States Navy and Air Force bases in Spain, supposedly committed the United States to acknowledge that Spain was threatened from North Africa by possible Algerian aggression, or by a possible Soviet-backed war in the Spanish colonies. There

was also a statement that the United States was obligated to defend Western Europe, "of which Spain is an integral part."<sup>11</sup> This statement could be construed as extending NATO guarantees to cover Spain, something that the State Department considered illegal.

At this writing, negotiations with Spain are still going on, but the dubious allusion which might have covered Spain under the NATO umbrella has reportedly been dropped. The episode furnished further fuel, however, for the arguments of those who claim the executive's penchant for making unchecked commitments has reached a dangerous point. It also tended to support the charges that the executive branch was unduly influenced by the views of the military-industrial complex.

A more objective look at the present controversy is possible only if the partisans of both views can divorce themselves from the passions aroused by the war in Vietnam. Champions of executive power might then see that Congress is not trying fundamentally to alter the constitutional balance in its favor. The resolutions which have been submitted concerning the nature of United States commitments are "sense of the Senate" resolutions. As such, they are not binding on the executive in the way the Bricker amendment would have been. The intent of those seeking a greater role for Congress is to warn the President that he must seek its approval before making politically significant commitments, particularly commitments which might lead to hostilities.

On the other hand, the champions of Congress must realize that enhancing the role of Congress with respect to military commitments will not necessarily lead to reduced military involvement overseas. Congress has often been the bellicose party in our foreign

*(Continued on page 116)*

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<sup>9</sup> *Washington Post*, March 13, 1969, p. A23.

<sup>10</sup> For the text of the June, 1969, Senate resolution on commitments, see p. 128.

<sup>11</sup> *Washington Post*, February 25, 1969, pp. A1, A17.



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# CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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## **SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY**

*On September 8, 1954, the U.S., Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and the Philippines signed a security pact setting up an organization known as SEATO. Excerpts follow:*

**ARTICLE II.** In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

**ARTICLE III.** The parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

**ARTICLE IV.** 1. Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereinafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. . . .

2. If, in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area . . . is threatened in any way other than armed attack or is . . . threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action . . . shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

**ARTICLE VIII.** As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the South-

west Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. . . .

## **GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION**

*On August 2 and 4, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats reportedly attacked U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. On August 7, Congress passed a resolution at the request of President Lyndon Johnson. Excerpts follow:*

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

**SEC. 2.** The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

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(Continued on page 128)

## BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

*(Continued from page 70)*

### THE POLICY OF THE 1930's

This warning had little effect, but it delineated the choice which confronted Franklin D. Roosevelt during the next nine years. In 1934, Roosevelt began a major naval building program and endorsed various kinds of economic and military aid to China. This approach contained too little and was put into effect too late. On July 7, 1937, a major conflict again broke out between Japan and China. At the Brussels Conference in November, the United States rejected Soviet suggestions that Russian-American political cooperation was needed to contain the Japanese. Again, the United States response was historically consistent: when Washington-Moscow relations were formally restored in November, 1933, the United States had refused a Soviet request for a non-aggression agreement that would indicate to the Japanese a common Russian-American concern for peace and stability in the Far East.

In 1939 and 1940, the United States used economic sanctions against Japan. It terminated the commercial treaty of 1911, imposed an embargo on exports of scrap iron and oil and, in July, 1941, froze all Japanese assets in the United States. By this time, however, these moves only sharpened the Japanese feeling that an economic sphere in Asia was necessary if Japan hoped to remain economically viable and politically stable. Japan was no longer willing to compete within an Open Door policy in order to retain such viability.

The United States policy also played into the hands of the militarists in Tokyo who were willing to use force to obtain new areas for markets, vital raw materials and the settlement of Japanese emigrants. In July, 1941, Japan completed a rapid conquest of French Indochina. In United States-Japanese negotiations which continued through November, Tokyo agreed under certain conditions to evacuate Indochina, but

refused to listen to United States demands for the abandonment of the campaign against China. To the Japanese, this was a matter to be settled between China and Japan; Tokyo would not allow United States mediation.

The tragedy that followed at Pearl Harbor can be traced back at least to the Washington Conference arrangements. The United States had had other alternatives. It could have worked with an independent, revolutionary China; cooperated with Soviet Russia as a check against Japan; built a navy which could have offset Tokyo's military supremacy in the western Pacific; or viewed United States interests in China as of too little significance to take the risks involved in keeping the doors open to the Chinese market.

To understand why none of these alternatives were followed, however, the story must be taken back yet further. In 1900, the United States had committed itself to the Open Door publicly because the McKinley administration believed the Chinese consumer to be essential to United States well-being. In the 1840's, Americans had formally entered the Asian scene because of a sense of their destiny and, above all, of their needs—both secular and spiritual. The United States involvement in China was neither sudden nor accidental, nor is the current American abhorrence of the Chinese revolution. The historical record helps to explain United States involvement in Asia and continues to play an important role in shaping the American distaste for the Chinese revolution.

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## WORLD WAR II IN ASIA

*(Continued from page 76)*

end of the war and had installed a puppet government under the nationalist, Ba Maw. This government cooperated with the Japanese, as the Indonesians had under Sukarno. When the British forces finally returned, it was not to restore imperial power but to handle the surrender and begin negotiations with the very same government in power for the formal emergence of Burma as an inde-

pendent state with Great Britain's blessing.

The Philippines had been liberated by MacArthur following the Leyte landings and the struggle for Luzon, so the surrender document did not apply. In fact, MacArthur had brought back with him the government-in-exile that had been ordered out of the Philippines at the beginning of the war and had resided in Washington in the interim. There had been a collaborationist government, but most of its participants were quickly and understandingly forgiven.

Military exigencies had been great catalysts for change along the far side of the Pacific basin, starting with Australia's dramatic turning to the United States, and the sudden demise of Western imperial presences throughout the Asian theater east of India and Ceylon. Few of the constants of United States strategy in the Pacific survived the war—including the belief in the importance of China and the Soviet Union to the defeat of Japan. The Soviet entrance into the war—an event Roosevelt and all the ingenuity of the United States government had worked so hard for—was anticlimactic. President Harry S. Truman made a flat and unenthusiastic announcement to the American people, not even bothering to send a word of encouragement or appreciation to the Soviet leaders.

In the vast area of former European colonial holdings in Asia, our military policies ultimately took on a subtler and more consciously political afterglow. Roosevelt used his known prejudice against European holdings in the Far East as a counterweight, trading a hands-off policy regarding the immediate restoration of colonial control for specific United States objectives. In its military planning the United States wanted to avoid the taint of association and refused to send American troops into such areas as Indochina and Indonesia as agents for the resumption of colonial authority. As one laconic guideline for the American Joint

Chiefs of Staff put it late in 1944: "It is compatible with our strategy to permit the reoccupation of British, French, or Dutch territory in the Far East without our military participation."<sup>10</sup> But it is hard to say just what would have constituted enlightened policy in the Asian theater at that time; the United States was engrossed with the short-run problem of winning—and very little else.

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## GLOBAL CONTAINMENT: THE TRUMAN YEARS

(Continued from page 83)

lacked the skilled manpower and industrial bases to develop self-sustaining military strength. Whereas the military structures of such countries would never be strong enough to resist aggression, they would always exceed in cost what the Asian economies could support. Thus they threatened the United States with an endless financial drain without contributing much useful defense.

It was essentially the absence of political stability that rendered the borderlands along the Asian periphery of Russia and China an unfortunate area in which to establish the barriers against Communist expansion. Such an effort at containment, warned Walter Lippmann in *The Cold War* (1947),<sup>1</sup> would compel the United States to stake its policies

upon satellites, puppets, clients, agents about whom we know very little. Frequently they will act . . . on their own judgments, presenting us with accomplished facts that we did not intend, and with crises for which we are unready. The "unassailable barriers" will present us with an unending series of insoluble dilemmas. We shall have either to disown our puppets, which would be tantamount to appeasement and defeat and the loss of face, or must support them at an incalculable cost on an unintended, unforeseen and perhaps undesirable issue.

From such dilemmas there would be no escape, for through the critical years of 1949 to 1951 United States officials had created an image of Asia which would not die, an image calculated to introduce the element of fear on a massive scale into the American con-

<sup>10</sup> For a very informative account of the evolution of American military thinking on such questions, see Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), pp. 490-504.

<sup>1</sup> Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War* (New York: Harpers, 1947).

ceptualization of the challenges which the United States faced. Global containment, responding to the challenge of an insatiable Soviet-based Communist monolith, elevated every Communist-led maneuver to first-level importance even where United States security interests were unclear and strategic conditions unfavorable. The policy would ultimately exact its toll in costly military involvements and a deeply divided nation.

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## COMMITMENTS IN ASIA: 1969

*(Continued from page 99)*

government has also relied heavily on the so-called "Tonkin Gulf Resolution" approved by the United States Senate. It is to be noted, however, that in certain mutual defense treaties, there is the stipulation that action will be taken by either party "in accordance with its constitutional processes." As this is being written, there is a Senate Committee investigation of United States military commitments around the world. How far the United States Senate or the Congress as a whole may be able to check the action of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the executive branch of the government in making military commitments to other countries is still an open question.

For Asia, perhaps the key problem is to determine who our real "clients" are—states for whom we are willing to accept the role of "patron," using our political, economic and military means to preserve them. The roles of "client" and "patron" in international politics are most difficult for both small and great powers. In Asia, American sympathies, American humanitarianism, American adherence to "moral" obligations have often led to unhappy and tragic military commitments. This is the problem for the future.

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## CONGRESS AND MILITARY COMMITMENTS

*(Continued from page 111)*

quarrels, while the President acted with restraint. It was the War Hawks—members of Congress all—who aggressively sought the

War of 1812. Historians have pointed out that President McKinley could have effected a Spanish withdrawal from Cuba in 1898 if he had been left alone, but he was pressured by both the press and Congress into requesting a declaration of war. His predecessor, Grover Cleveland, had simply ignored a 1896 concurrent resolution recognizing the belligerency of the Cuban rebels.

In short, the separation of powers doctrine is often interpreted in relation to the perceptions of international realities held by the two branches of government. When these two perceptions coincide, the two branches usually collaborate effectively, if not always agreeing on the extent of their separate powers. But when they view the substance of foreign policy in conflicting light, clashes over specific measures are occasionally transformed into clashes over their respective spheres of power. Since substantive disagreements are as likely to occur in the future as in the past, the struggle for power of which Corwin wrote is also likely to continue.

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## GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA

*(Continued from page 92)*

of negotiations. President Johnson's belated willingness to make such concessions as the partial and complete bombing halts of 1968 developed not only because of the pressures of domestic opinion, but also in recognition of the possibility of still further escalation by the Communists which would in turn lead to greater United States escalation.

The bombing of North Vietnam had been designed to halt the flow of arms from the north to the south. It was subsequently established, however, that the bombing was far less effective than had been expected. It seemed to have the consequence, indeed, of bolstering the adversary's morale. Continuation of United States air attacks through October, 1968, may have been the result of pride and inertia.

There is much to be learned from the United States military intervention in Vietnam in the years 1960–1968. A modest com-



mitment by the Eisenhower administration was allowed to grow wholly out of proportion to the value of Vietnam to the United States. The wholesale introduction of United States troops into Vietnam in the years 1965–1968 largely missed the point of what was wrong in Vietnam, and what was needed to redress the situation.

It is not fair to argue on the basis of Vietnam that the United States actively sought the role of “policeman” in Southeast Asia in the years 1960–1968. It intervened in Vietnam reluctantly because, rightly or wrongly, it saw no alternative. In other Asian situations the United States was more realistic. President Kennedy did not commit troops to Laos in 1961. And the United States did not commit itself militarily in the Indonesian-Malaysian war of the mid-1960’s.

United States assistance to Burma in her war against her Communists, which was 20 years old in 1968, was modest, consisting of a small amount of equipment and some very limited training of Burmese in the use of this equipment. The implied threat of force by the Philippines against Malaysia in the persisting Sabah crisis did not actively engage the United States. And United States participation in the earlier Dutch-Indonesian showdown over West Irian (Western New Guinea), which came to a head in 1962, was wholly political.

The United States, in short, probably did not overreact elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the Kennedy-Johnson years, 1960–1968. But out of fear and ignorance it clearly overreacted in Vietnam, to its own considerable regret, and probably to the marginal advantage of South Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia.

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## U.S. DEFENSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

*(Continued from page 104)*

national interests. Those three countries are Japan, Australia and the United States. Americans should now begin to think of an appropriate structure which will allow Washington, Tokyo and Canberra to support, with

concrete deeds, this common and vital interest.

Asian nations, especially the less secure Southeast Asian states, are likely to find acceptable a security framework in which they bear as much of their security burden as possible, and in which the three “outside” powers join together as donors.

In such a framework, Japan, Australia and the United States might agree to provide the necessary backup of sophisticated weapons, training assistance and financing—but *not* manpower—in a new Southeast Asian defensive agreement. The only direct members of such a group would be the threatened Asian nations. In Southeast Asia the 5-nation grouping known as ASEAN, for example, could provide the format for precisely such a step: Indonesian, Thai and Philippine leaders have informally made such suggestions already.

Such an approach would not require the immediate or even the early abandonment of SEATO, nor would it necessitate canceling United States bilateral commitments to such old relationships as the security commitment to the Philippines. But a joint ASEAN force, designed to combat insurgencies and made effective by the special skills that only Japan, Australia and the United States can provide in the Asia-Pacific region, would represent a major step towards revitalizing the United States historic objective in Asia: multilateralism as the best hope for avoiding a new war in East Asia. And perhaps most important, it would allow for that eventual American disengagement in Asia on which peace with China depends.

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## THE EISENHOWER ERA IN ASIA

*(Continued from page 87)*

out with precision the direct area of United States concern in the Far East, such as that contained in the statement by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson with regard to Korea.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Acheson had drawn a defense line in the Pacific which was interpreted by many to exclude Korea from United States defense commitments in the area—a statement that many believe invited the North Korean attack in June, 1950.

While the Eisenhower policy in Asia admittedly left much to be desired in classical military terms, its ambiguity regarding what response the United States would make in the event of Communist attack in the area was probably desirable, given the realities of the developing international military environment and United States domestic politics.

The Eisenhower policy has been summed up accurately by Professor Robert E. Osgood of the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research. Osgood points out that

The Eisenhower-Dulles administration hoped that, given the clarification of American interests by means of . . . alliances . . . coupled with the more explicit intention to apply a strategy of massive and selective nuclear retaliation against direct Chinese aggression or Soviet supported attacks on the Asian periphery, American nuclear power would be a sufficient deterrent and would spare the United States the problem of preparing to fight a series of local wars at points of communist choosing.<sup>11</sup>

A much publicized manifestation of Eisenhower's officially stated concern over the importance of Southeast Asia in United States policy was his so-called domino theory. It was Eisenhower's belief that the loss of Vietnam would lead to the loss of the associated Indochinese states of Laos and Cambodia and that eventually Thailand, Burma and Malaya would also be in grave danger. It is interesting to note that the domino theory, whether stated explicitly or not, came into vogue during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Johnson administration undertook the massive United States commitment to Vietnam in part on the assumption that a defeat in South Vietnam would open up the floodgates to all Southeast Asia. The concern was always largely over Thailand, which was and still is considered to be the keystone of United States policy in Southeast Asia.

Referring to the Eisenhower statement that the countries of Southeast Asia were like a set of dominoes and that if one country fell to communism they would all fall, Osgood observes:

<sup>11</sup> *Alliance and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 77.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

. . . the United States [under Eisenhower] had declined to put its ground forces into Indo-China although, in official statements comparing the loss of Indo-China to a row of falling dominoes, it had acknowledged a vital interest in preventing a communist victory in that area.<sup>12</sup>

Eisenhower's whole system of alliances was primarily intended to reinforce a policy of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, he refused efforts on the part of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines to deploy forces at key points along the Asian periphery.

The commitments he undertook were deliberately flexible, thus leaving the United States with an ample range of options.

In retrospect, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has been accused of "pactomania" because of his preoccupation with treaties to deal with the Communist threat in the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. Dulles' treaty diplomacy was undoubtedly inspired in large part by the success of NATO. He and other political figures in and out of Congress held the simplistic notion that the Communist threat in Asia and other parts of the world could be handled by more NATO's—despite the increasingly obvious fact that the circumstances, problems and conditions which made NATO a successful bulwark did not obtain in other areas.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of June, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Latin America

June 4—The Latin American foreign ministers meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, propose new bases for inter-American economic and social cooperation beyond the Alliance for Progress. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*, June 11.)

June 21—The U.S. agrees to work through a special inter-American committee to set up "new bases and instruments of action" for economic cooperation with Latin America. The decision to set up the committee is made by the heads of delegations of the 22 republics participating at the sixth meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States. The committee will begin its work in Washington October 20.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

June 3—Israeli Premier Golda Meir demands that the American oil company that owns the pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Lebanon provide protection against Arab sabotage. Until protection is provided, Israel will keep the line closed.

June 15—A three-hour artillery duel across the Suez Canal extends along a 20-mile front.

June 18—Lebanese government sources report that Arab commandos are withdrawing from the country.

June 23—Israeli commandos sabotage a Jordanian irrigation project.

June 24—Arab saboteurs destroy an oil pipeline near the port of Haifa. Several suspects have been arrested.

June 25—The Israeli government relocates Arab families living near the Wailing Wall

following explosions in the area planted by Arab guerrillas.

June 30—A power line between the Aswan Dam and Cairo is destroyed by Israeli commandos.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

June 2—Leo A. J. Cadieux, Canadian Defense Minister, reports that Canada will meet her NATO obligations with a "mobile, modern but smaller" land force stationed in Europe. Canada now has 10,000 troops in the NATO forces.

June 18—The U.S. and NATO submit bills to France covering the costs of moving defense bases from France to other European countries. The move was made necessary by France's expulsion of NATO in 1966 and 1967.

### Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

June 2—The Secretary General of the O.A.S., Galo Plaza Lasso, warns that the student protests which have marred New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller's trip to Latin America are a reflection of increasing frustration and disillusion with the U.S. in Latin America.

June 14—A meeting of economists from the O.A.S. countries opens in Port of Spain, Trinidad, to consider U.S. import restrictions, aid policies tied to purchases of high-priced U.S. goods, and soaring interest rates on development loans.

June 27—El Salvador and Honduras break diplomatic relations; each asks the O.A.S. for support.

### United Nations

June 3—The government of North Vietnam has invited a representative of the U.N.

Children's Fund to visit Hanoi to discuss a possible aid program. This is the first official overture made to the U.N. by North Vietnam.

June 5—Over the opposition of Latin American members, Cuba is elected to a seat on the governing board of the U.N. Development Program.

June 10—By unanimous vote, the Security Council extends the presence of the peace-keeping force on Cyprus for another six months, until December 15.

## War in Vietnam

June 7—North Vietnamese shells and missiles strike Danang in a series of barrages directed at U.S. bases. The attacks are timed to coincide with U.S. President Richard Nixon's meeting with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu on Midway Island.

June 8—President Nixon states that the U.S. will pull 25,000 U.S. troops out of South Vietnam before the end of August, 1969.

June 10—South Vietnam's National Liberation Front (Vietcong) announces the establishment of a "provisional revolutionary government." The new provisional government represents a wider spectrum of political membership than the N.L.F. which was set up 8 years ago as a resistance front.

June 14—Tran Bhu Kiem represents the new provisional revolutionary government of the Vietcong at the Paris peace talks as he did the National Liberation Front.

June 17—U.S. intelligence sources report that North Vietnamese troops have reoccupied Apbia mountain, captured last month by U.S. paratroopers at a cost of 50 lives.

June 19—North Vietnamese troops launch 6 attacks against Tayninh, 50 miles northwest of Saigon.

June 22—South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu says that the South Vietnamese armed forces are ready to shoulder a major responsibility for fighting the war.

June 24—An allied special forces camp in the central highlands at Benhet which has been under siege since early May is surrounded and cut off. North Vietnamese

troops open a ground attack.

Supplies are brought to the besieged allied camp by tanks and armored cars.

June 25—General Creighton W. Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam, transfers 64 U.S. Navy river patrol gunboats to the South Vietnamese navy.

June 26—South Vietnamese troops are airlifted into besieged Benhet to relieve U.S. troops. Four battalions of South Vietnamese pull back from positions defending a road that had been opened to carry supplies to the base.

## ARGENTINA

June 1—It is reported that more than 400 persons, including two priests, are awaiting trial by military tribunal in Córdoba following their arrest during the street fighting that accompanied the general strike of May 29 and 30.

June 4—The military government institutes new provisions for its so-called anti-Communist law under which labor leaders can be jailed for up to six years.

June 5—President Juan Carlos Onganía lifts the state of limited martial law imposed last week during the nationwide general strike.

June 16—President Onganía appoints General Jorge Raul to take over the provincial government in Córdoba and dispatches federal troops to that city. A workers' holiday is also declared to forestall an anti-government strike scheduled for tomorrow.

June 18—President Onganía completes the reorganization of his Cabinet following the recent wave of violence and disorder. Jose Rafael Caceres Monie, a wealthy landowner, is named Defense Minister.

June 26—Demonstrators bomb 9 supermarkets owned by a development firm controlled by the Rockefeller family. The government bans all demonstrations in anticipation of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller's visit.

June 29—Police scatter demonstrators gathered to protest the visit of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller.

June 30—Rockefeller visits President Juan

Carlos Onganía. At the time of the meeting, unknown assailants kill Augusto Vandor, president of the Metal Workers Union, who refused to urge a general strike in protest against the Rockefeller mission.

### **BOLIVIA**

June 7—It is announced that the Inter-American Bank has approved two loans for \$9.95 million for Bolivian development of electric power facilities and the building of a gas pipeline.

### **BRAZIL**

June 9—A directive from the Ministry of Justice delivered to the directors of newspapers and broadcasting stations warns that only favorable news about New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller's visit should be published.

June 16—Governor Rockefeller arrives in Brazil on his fact-finding mission for President Nixon. His arrival is preceded by the arrest of hundreds of student leaders and political opponents of the regime of President Artur da Costa e Silva.

### **CAMBODIA**

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### **CANADA**

(See also *Intl, NATO*)

June 23—Leo Cadieux, Minister of Defense, announces that Canada will reduce her armed forces from the present level of 98,000 to 80,000 over the next three years.

### **CHILE**

June 2—Government officials and executives of the U.S.-owned Anaconda Company open negotiations for the Chileanization of the company's copper mining operations.

June 3—The police use tear gas to break up student demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy protesting the forthcoming visit of New York Governor Rockefeller.

June 4—In the face of threatened strikes and violence, the Chilean government asks the U.S. to call off the visit of Governor Rockefeller. Chile indicates she will fulfill the purpose of Rockefeller's fact-finding mission by having Foreign Minister Gabriel

Valdes meet with the governor next week in Washington.

June 26—An agreement to purchase Anaconda's 49 per cent interest in 2 big copper mines over a 3-year period is announced by the Chilean government. The "nationalization by agreement" is hailed as a constructive alternative to expropriation.

### **CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)**

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

June 6—The Foreign Ministry presents a note to the Soviet Embassy in Peking charging new border provocations in April and May, 1969.

June 7—*Hsinhua*, the official news agency, reports that China has accepted the Soviet proposal to hold border discussions. The meeting will be held on June 18.

### **CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)**

June 25—Chiang Ching-kuo, elder son of President Chiang Kai-shek, is named Deputy Premier in a Cabinet shuffle.

### **CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)**

June 30—The official Algerian Press Service announces that former Premier Moïse Tshombe has died of a heart attack in an Algerian prison.

### **CUBA**

June 1—Several hundred Vietnamese students greet Tran Bhu Kiem, chief Vietcong negotiator at the Paris peace talks, on his arrival in Cuba for a brief visit.

It is reported that U.S. black militant Eldridge Cleaver is under virtual house arrest in the luxury penthouse apartment provided for him by the Cuban government.

June 25—Raymond Johnson, who describes himself as a lieutenant in the U.S. Black Panther movement, tells newsmen in Cuba that he has been instructed by high-ranking Black Panthers in Cuba to reveal their dissatisfaction with the treatment accorded them by the Cuban government.



## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- June 4—Pro-Soviet conservatives are being appointed to Presidium posts, replacing liberals forced to resign last week.
- June 13—2,000 local and factory commissions are set up by the Communist party to purge opponents of pro-Soviet orthodoxy.
- June 17—Conservative Communist Lubomir Strougal announces a further purge of liberals in the Communist party.
- June 20—The national Student Union is dissolved by the government.

## ECUADOR

- June 20—The Ecuadorian Embassy in Washington announces that 9 U.S. fishing boats have been taken into port and ordered out of territorial waters without being fined.

## EIRE

- June 19—Fianna Fail, the ruling party, wins reelection in yesterday's voting. The party has been in office for 12 years.

## FRANCE

- June 2—Initial returns from the presidential election give Gaullist party candidate Georges Pompidou 44 per cent of the vote; Alain Poher, Centrist candidate, 23 per cent; Jacques Duclos, Communist candidate, 21 per cent. The final run-off election will be held June 15.
- June 13—The prime bank rate is increased from 6 to 7 per cent because of France's deteriorating balance of payments position.
- June 16—Returns from yesterday's presidential election give Georges Pompidou more than 57 per cent of the vote. Alain Poher receives 42 per cent. President-elect Pompidou will be inaugurated on June 20.
- June 20—President Pompidou takes office and names Jacques Chaban-Delmas as Premier.
- June 22—President Pompidou selects Maurice Schumann as Foreign Minister, replacing Michel Debré. The new Foreign Minister is considered to be an "internationalist" who will cooperate with the Common Market. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing becomes Minister of Economy and Finance.

- June 25—Sea trials begin for France's first nuclear submarine, a 9,000-ton vessel which will carry 16 Polaris-type missiles.

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

- June 26—Mayor Klaus Schutz of West Berlin says that West Germany should recognize existing boundaries with Poland.
- The *Bundestag* (the lower house of Parliament) extends the law authorizing trial and prosecution of Nazi war criminals.

## GREECE

- June 27—The military government dismisses Michael Stasinopoulos, president of the Council of State, which was set up before World War II to protect citizens from arbitrary government action.
- June 28—Nine of the 25 judges resign from the Council of State in protest over the dismissal of the council president.

## GUATEMALA

- June 1—Mario Lopez Villatoro, a leader of the anti-Communist National Liberation Movement, and his bodyguard are shot to death while traveling through a shopping center in Guatemala City.

## HAITI

- June 7—It is reported that three men linked to a June 4 air raid on Haiti have been returned to Miami where the mission originated. The bullet-riddled plane landed at a U.S. missile tracking station on Grand Bahama Island.

## INDIA

- June 25—A general strike ties up Hyderabad, the capital city of Andhra Pradesh in southern India, as demonstrations continue in the drive for breakaway statehood by the disadvantaged half of this Indian state.
- June 28—The chief minister and seven other ministers resign from the Andhra Pradesh state cabinet as separatist agitation continues.

## ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

## JAPAN

June 3—Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi tells U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers that Japan will permit the U.S. to continue using bases on Okinawa but wants to restrict their use. Aichi demands that Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands be returned to Japanese control by 1972.

## MALAYSIA

June 19—A joint program for the defense of Malaysia and Singapore is announced at a conference of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. The British have announced their intention of pulling out all troops from the area in 1971, but airlifted troops will take part in joint defense maneuvers.

## MEXICO

June 4—Carlos Madrazo, long-time leader of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary party, is killed in a plane crash.

June 6—The Mexican government oil monopoly announces the cancellation of contracts with four U.S. oil companies for mainland and offshore drilling rights and agrees to pay \$18 million to the four companies: Continental Oil, Pauley Petroleum, Pauley Pan American Petroleum and American Independent Oil.

## NETHERLANDS, THE

### Netherlands Antilles

#### Curacao

June 1—A 12-hour curfew is called following outbreaks of looting and arson by oil refinery workers. The labor unions blame government attempts to encourage low wages by an off-island contracting company for the rioting. Destruction is estimated to amount to \$25 million. Four persons have been killed and 150 injured.

June 3—Premier Ciro de Kroon accedes to labor union demands and dissolves Parliament. New elections will be held shortly.

## NIGERIA

June 30—The government announces that it will administer relief shipments of food and

medicine formerly coordinated by the International Red Cross. Observers fear that relief to starving Biafrans will be drastically curtailed.

## PANAMA

June 13—Colonel Bolivar Urrutia is installed as Acting President of Panama during the illness of Provisional President José Pinilla, who had a mild heart attack last week.

## PARAGUAY

June 20—Governor Rockefeller meets with President Alfredo Stroessner and other Paraguayan officials.

## PERU

June 14—It is reported that Peru's army radicals forced a leading moderate out of the government this week. General José Benavides, Minister of Agriculture, resigned after President Juan Velasco Alvarado announced that price controls would be imposed on meat, potatoes and rice.

June 24—The government announces that all large tracts of privately owned land will be expropriated, and that just compensation will be made to the present owners.

June 25—Details of Peru's new land reform law are announced by the government: expropriated lands will be sold to cooperatives, peasant communities, agricultural societies of special interests and persons previously judged qualified.

June 26—The military government seizes land, chemical plants and bank accounts of the U.S.-owned W. R. Grace and Company. The government occupies the offices of all major landowning corporations.

## RHODESIA

(See also *United Kingdom*)

June 20—The white-dominated electorate votes overwhelmingly in favor of a new constitution which makes apartheid inevitable and supports independence.

June 21—Rhodesia will be proclaimed a republic on November 11, according to a statement made by Prime Minister Ian Smith.

## RUMANIA

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

June 6—On the second day of the conference of 75 Communist parties in Moscow, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania criticizes speeches which attack China. Rumania agreed to attend the conference on the understanding that the policies of other Communist countries would not be attacked at the meeting.

## SOUTH AFRICA

June 30—The BOSS bill is enacted into law. Under the bill, persons under investigation by the Bureau of State Security may not give evidence in their own behalf, nor may the press be informed of the Bureau's activities.

## SOUTHERN YEMEN

June 22—Qahtan al-Shaabi, President of Southern Yemen, resigns and is replaced by a 5-man council.

June 23—The 5-man Presidential Council appoints a new Premier, Mohammed Ali Haitham, and a chairman of the Council, Salem Ali Rubaya.

## SPAIN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

June 7—The government announces it will close the border with Gibraltar. This will deprive Gibraltar of its main source of labor and deprive 4,800 Spanish workers of their jobs.

June 20—An agreement is signed in Madrid between the U.S. and Spain extending temporarily the U.S. lease on four bases in Spain. Renegotiation of the lease has been the subject of controversy for months.

June 25—Foreign Minister Fernando Maria Castiella y Maiz announces that Spain will halt ferry service between Spain and Gibraltar. Gibraltar's only remaining link to the mainland is a British plane service.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Rumania*)

June 5—A conference of 75 Communist parties around the world opens in Moscow.

Parties from Yugoslavia, China and most of Asia are absent.

June 6—The official Communist party newspaper *Pravda* prints a sharp warning to Arab extremists not to use force to regain territory occupied by Israel since the June, 1967, war.

June 10—Peking radio accuses the U.S.S.R. of an attack in northwest Sinkiang province.

June 13—The U.S.S.R. becomes the 12th nation to recognize the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam established by the National Liberation Front.

June 17—A communiqué hailing the meeting of 75 of the world's Communist parties is issued as the meeting closes. 14 of the attending parties voiced reservations or opposition to the communiqué.

June 18—The Soviet-Chinese Border Commission meets in Khabarovsk to discuss the border clashes on a disputed island in the Ussuri River in March, 1969. Other clashes along the 4,500-mile border between the two countries have taken place since March.

## UNITED KINGDOM

(See also *Rhodesia*)

June 20—A \$1-billion standby credit is granted to Great Britain by the International Monetary Fund to strengthen the pound in international markets while the British economy is being reformed.

June 24—The government accepts the resignation of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the British Governor General of Rhodesia. The June 20 referendum in Rhodesia makes final the break between the two countries.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

June 11—The Department of Agriculture announces that 42 additional areas in 17 states are to be covered by the government's food stamp program for needy families.

### Civil Rights

June 21—The Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, leader of the Southern Christian

Leadership Conference, is jailed on charges of inciting to riot in Charleston, South Carolina, during the continuing strike of 400 Negro hospital workers.

## Economy

June 9—The prime rate—the minimum interest charge for bank loans to the most creditworthy corporations—rises one percentage point to 8.5 per cent, the highest prime rate on record.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

June 4—At the commencement exercises of the Air Force Academy, President Richard Nixon criticizes the “new isolationists,” and rules out unilateral disarmament.

June 5—Secretary of State William Rogers says test firing of strategic missiles will continue; congressmen have declared that the tests will hamper arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

June 6—After a closed-door meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rogers concedes that continued testing of multiple warheads might raise “new problems of inspection” for an arms control agreement.

June 11—The U.S. announces an agreement in principle with Cambodia on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

In Washington, Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdés gives President Nixon a list of Latin America’s complaints about U.S. aid and trade policies; the memorandum was drawn up by the Latin American foreign ministers meeting in Venezuela.

June 14—The Department of State admits that U.S. troops cooperated in joint maneuvers in Spain, to practice quelling a theoretical rebellion against the government of Spanish Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

June 19—At a televised news conference, the President declares that he hopes to recall the combat troops from Vietnam even faster than has been suggested by his critics.

June 20—The U.S. and Spain sign an agreement in Madrid extending U.S. use of American-built bases in Spain for 15

months. In return, the U.S. will give Spain \$50 million in arms, plus a reported \$35 million in Export-Import Bank credits for additional military purchases.

June 25—Voting 70 to 16 after 5 days of discussion, the Senate approves a sense-of-the-Senate resolution asking the executive branch of the government not to commit troops or funds to foreign countries without the express approval of both houses of Congress. (For text see p. 128.)

June 26—High administration sources report that the President has chosen a 5-man team to negotiate on missile limitation with the U.S.S.R. Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Gerard C. Smith is to head the group; negotiations are expected to start in late summer.

June 28—The White House announces that the President plans to travel to the Pacific for the splashdown of the Apollo 11 moon vehicle; after a subsequent visit to 5 Asian nations, he will visit Rumania. He will be the first U.S. President to visit a Communist country since World War II.

## Government

June 5—The conservation organization, the Sierra Club, files suit against the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to ban a planned \$35-million year-round recreation development by the Walt Disney Corporation in the Sequoia National Forest, charging that the development would cause “irreparable damage.”

The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, appointed after the assassination of New York Senator Robert Kennedy, issues a 22-chapter report on violence in American life, noting that the American people have become a “rather bloody-minded people in both action and reaction.”

June 6—The U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rules that draft boards may not reclassify registrants because of anti-draft or antiwar activities.

Officials of the Labor Department reveal that the department has ordered an immediate one-third cut in enrollment of the

Neighborhood Youth Corps, a year-round out-of-school program, plus an end to hiring those 18 or older.

June 10—The government reveals that it has agreed to lease to New York City a major part of the Brooklyn Army Terminal for redevelopment; the city will also receive a \$948,000 federal grant to help convert part of the former Brooklyn Navy Yard to industrial use.

The Judicial Conference of the U.S. elaborates rules forbidding all federal judges except members of the Supreme Court to accept outside fees. All other federal judges must make annual reports of their investments and other assets.

June 12—The Food and Drug Administration orders 49 frequently used antibiotics off the market because they are ineffective or dangerous.

New York's Mayor John Lindsay receives \$70 million in federal grants for the Model Cities Program in New York.

June 13—The Justice Department formally charges the U.S. Steel Corporation with violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it systematically forces companies from which it makes purchases to buy U.S. Steel products in exchange; a settlement is announced. U.S. Steel has agreed "perpetually" to refrain from such arrangements.

June 17—White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler announces that the President has ordered a review of the U.S. chemical and biological warfare programs.

June 19—The President names Dr. William David McElroy to replace Dr. Leland Haworth as director of the National Science Foundation.

June 24—The Senate confirms the nomination of Otto F. Otepka as a \$36-thousand-a-year member of the Subversive Activities Control Board; Otepka was dismissed from the State Department in 1963 on charges that he had given confidential personnel security files to the Senate Internal Security subcommittee without department permission. The Subversive Activities Control Board is largely inactive.

June 25—Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the Interior, suggests that federal offshore leasing regulations should be stricter, and that they should provide for public participation in decision on such leases.

June 26—Attorney General John N. Mitchell outlines the administration's proposal to revise voting rights legislation. Critics charge that the proposed radical revision of supervision of election law changes will weaken legislation to protect Negro voters.

The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor discloses that the Mafia crime syndicate has a "virtual monopoly" on bananas imported into the New York area and on most meat passing through Jersey City, N.J. Testimony on the influence of the Mafia is being heard by the New Jersey Assembly's Labor Relations Committee.

June 28—President Nixon names Dr. Roger O. Egeberg, dean of the School of Medicine of the University of Southern California, as Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for Health and Scientific Affairs. Yesterday H.E.W. Secretary Robert Finch announced that he had given up a 5½-month fight for the nomination of Bostonian Dr. John Knowles for the post; Knowles was opposed by conservative Republicans and the American Medical Association.

June 30—The President signs a stopgap law allowing collection of the 10 per cent surtax in July. The House votes 210 to 205 to extend the tax beyond July; the bill goes to the Senate.

The President names Gilbert W. Fitzhugh to chair a panel that will study Defense Department operations.

## Labor

June 18—A 2-day-old strike of deck officers ends when the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots reaches an agreement with 7 major steamship lines.

June 19—Some 240 federal air traffic controllers slow air travel across the nation in protest against remarks made during a congressional investigation by Federal Aviation Administrator John H. Shaffer, who has



testified that he does not think the controllers are working under too much stress or that they are underpaid.

June 20—A committee of grape growers meets with the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee to discuss a settlement of the 4-year-old dispute between California grape growers and workers.

June 27—The 3-month-old strike of Negro hospital workers at the Medical College of South Carolina Hospital ends; the strike continues at the Charleston County Hospital.

## Military

June 2—During maneuvers in the South China Sea, the U.S. destroyer *Frank E. Evans* collides with the Australian aircraft carrier, the *Melbourne*. The bow of the *Evans* sinks and 74 men are lost.

June 10—In an economy move, the Defense Department cancels the manned orbiting laboratory program of the Air Force; \$1.3 billion has already been spent on the program.

June 23—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird alters his warning about the Soviet missile threat; in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he suggests that the U.S.S.R. is developing a "first strike weapon" against the U.S. Minuteman missile; 3 months ago he warned that the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability" against the U.S.

June 26—Representative William S. Moorhead (D., Pa.) reveals that on June 19 the Air Force awarded an \$87-million contract to General Electric for 68 missile re-entry vehicles (MIRV's), the first production run for equipment for 500 Minutemen 3 missiles. The contract was awarded the day the President said that the Administration was considering a moratorium on MIRV testing.

June 27—The Defense Department says it plans to burn 12,643 tons of poisonous gas at U.S. military installations instead of dumping the gas into the Atlantic Ocean. (See *U.S., Military Policy, Current History*, July, 1969, p. 61.)

## Politics

June 18—Republican State Senator John J. Marchi and Democratic Controller Mario A. Procaccino win the mayoralty primary elections in New York City. Mayor John Lindsay, who has lost to Marchi, says he will "create a new urban party" and seek reelection as mayor of New York.

## Supreme Court

June 2—The Court rules unanimously that the Montgomery, Alabama, school board may be required to establish the same ratio of white to black school teachers in each school as there are in the school system as a whole; desegregation may require that teachers be assigned according to racial ratios.

The Court rules 7 to 1 to uphold a lower court ruling that Gaston County, North Carolina, cannot be excused from coverage under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, holding that its literacy test discriminates against Negroes, many of whom are illiterate because they attended inferior segregated schools prior to 1954.

The Court rules 5 to 3 that a serviceman cannot be courtmartialed for a crime committed off a military base within the U.S. unless the crime is "service-connected."

June 9—The Senate votes 74 to 3 to confirm the nomination of Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, succeeding Earl Warren.

In an unsigned opinion, the Court rules that the criminal syndicalism law in Ohio violates the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and is unconstitutional. The law permits the conviction of those who urge violence against the state without intention or capacity to accomplish violence.

The Court rules that the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine" requiring radio and television broadcasters to offer both sides of important issues is constitutional.

In a 7-to-1 ruling, the Court declares that Wisconsin's wage garnishment law is unconstitutional since it permits creditors to garnish the wages of purchasers with-

out proving the existence of a debt. Similar legislation in 16 other states is also by implication unconstitutional.

June 16—The Court rules 7 to 1 that the House of Representatives violated the Constitution by excluding Representative Adam Clayton Powell (N.Y., D.) from the 90th Congress.

June 23—Warren E. Burger becomes 15th Chief Justice of the U.S.

Before the retirement of Chief Justice Warren, the Court issues 3 decisions on the rights of criminal suspects, declaring that:

the Fifth Amendment's ban against double jeopardy is binding on state courts in the same way it has traditionally been binding on federal courts;

police may not search the home of a suspect incidental to his arrest but must have a search warrant before any area other than his immediate surroundings may be searched;

a convict whose conviction has been overturned cannot be given a stiffer sentence at a second trial without concrete reasons for such actions given by the trial judge.

## URUGUAY

June 20—Terrorists burn the General Motors building in Montevideo, causing damage estimated at \$1 million.

June 21—New York Governor Rockefeller arrives at Punta del Este, protected by Uruguayan air force jet fighters and a heavy complement of ground troops.

June 22—Rockefeller leaves Uruguay, completing the third of his four fact-finding trips in Latin America for President Nixon.

June 24—President Jorge Pacheco Areco, faced with a new wave of disabling strikes and a move in Congress to impeach him, declares a limited state of siege.

## VENEZUELA

June 1—President Rafael Caldera asks Rockefeller to postpone his visit to Venezuela, indicating that the visit might set off a round of violence.

## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

June 12—Four nations announce that they will recognize the provisional revolutionary government proclaimed by the Vietcong. The governments are North Vietnam, North Korea, Syria and Poland.

June 16—As a result of new taxes imposed by Premier Tran Van Huong, the House of Representatives urges President Nguyen Van Thieu to call a special session of Parliament to consider a vote of "no confidence" in the Cabinet.

## YUGOSLAVIA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 113)

### SENATE RESOLUTION ON NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, 1969

*On June 25, 1969, after 5 days of discussion of the executive authority to formulate foreign policy and to make military commitments, the Senate voted 70 to 16 to assert its foreign policy prerogatives as follows:*

Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore be it

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That it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the legislative and executive branches of the United States government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.

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